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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order granting Highland City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment by the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah on June 30, 1992, This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1.) Whether conditions placed on a developer by Highland 
City, a governmental entity as prerequisites to the acceptance 
and certification of a subdivision plat map are governmental 
functions for which no waiver exists. 
2.) Whether Highland City, a governmental entity may be 
held liable for failing to inspect and maintain private roads. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §63-20-2(4) (1988) provides in relevant part: 
(a) "Governmental function" means any act, 
failure to act, operation, function, or 
undertaking of a governmental entity whether 
or not the act, failure to act, operation, 
function, or undertaking is characterized as 
governmental, proprietary, a core 
governmental function, unique to government, 
undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to 
or not essential to a government or 
governmental function, or could be performed 
by private enterprise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be 
performed by any department, agency, 
employee, agent or officer of a governmental 
entity. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1985) provides in relevant part: 
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Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune 
from suit for any injury which results from 
the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmental-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and 
from an approved medical, nursing, or other 
professional health care clinical training 
program conducted in either public or private 
facilities. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 (1) (c)&(d) (1989) provides in relevant 
part: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury: 
(c) arises out of the issuance, 
denial, suspension, or revocation 
of, or by the failure or refusal to 
issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any 
permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar 
authorization; or 
(d) arises out of a failure to 
make an inspection or by reason of 
making an inadequate or negligent 
inspection or any property; or 
See also Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8 attached as Exhibit "1" to the 
addendum. Both the version in effect at the time of the accident 
and the present time are attached. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
This is a personal injury action. Plaintiff has alleged 
that Highland City was negligent when it required the developer, 
as part of the subdivision plat approval process, to move Oakview 
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Drive further south. Plaintiff also argues that Highland City 
was negligent with respect to maintenance and inspection on 
Oakview Drive. 
Highland City is immune for its activities encompassing the 
acceptance and certification of the Oakview PUD. See generally, 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 (1) (c) . Highland City is immune from 
claims alleging a failure to inspect. See generally, Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30-10(1) (d) . Highland City had no duty to maintain or 
inspect Oakview Drive, due to the fact that it is a private road. 
The trial court agreed and granted Highland City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1). This is a tort personal injury action. The plaintiff 
was involved in an automobile accident on January 18, 1990 at the 
intersection of 6000 West and 11500 North (Oakview Drive), Utah 
County, State of Utah. As a result of that accident, the 
plaintiff is a paraplegic. 
2). 11500 North (hereinafter referred to as Oakview Drive) 
provides access to Oakview Planned Unit Development. Oakview PUD 
contains eight lots. It was developed by Paul Frampton. The 
plat map for Oakview PUD was accepted by the Highland City 
Council on July 9, 1980. A copy of that plat map is attached at 
Exhibit "2" to the Addendum. 
3). Pursuant to the provisions of the Highland City Planned 
Unit Development regulations, Oakview Drive remained a private 
road belonging to Oakview Planned Unit Development. The original 
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plat map attached as Exhibit "3" to the Addendum, was 
subsequently amended in December 8, 1988 to reflect the fact that 
Oakview was a planned unit development. 
4). The de Villiers family moved into a home in Oakview PUD 
in the Summer of 1986. The family lived in Oakview PUD 
continuously from that time until sometime after the accident on 
January 18, 1990. 
5). The plaintiff received her Utah driver's license in 
March 1985. Thereafter, she would drive, on the average of four 
time per day, on Oakview Drive, using the intersection at 6000 
West. 
6). The plaintiff knew, prior to this accident that she was 
required to stop at the intersection of Oakview Drive and 6000 
West when she was traveling westbound on Oakview Drive, 
approaching the intersection with 6000 West. [Depo of M. de 
Villiers at p. 24:8-17.] 
7). Maintenance of Oakview Drive was the responsibility of 
the homeowners in Oakview PUD [Depo of P. Frampton at 17:17-20.] 
8). 6000 West, where it intersects with Oakview Drive, is a 
county road. [Complaint at Paragraph 8.] [Depo of P. Hawker at 
13:11-14.] 
9). The accident occurred when the 1987 Nissan Pulsar being 
driven by the plaintiff was struck by a 1970 Datsun 240Z heading 
northbound on 6000 West being driven by Ryan Boley. The 
collision occurred on 6000 West. [Complaint at Paragraph 4.] 
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10). The plaintiff testified that she stopped at the 
intersection before the accident occurred. She has no memory 
after proceeding into the intersection. [Depo of M. de Villiers 
at p. 36:3-10 and p. 50:1-7.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Acceptance of Plat Map 
Highland City's activities relating to the acceptance and 
certification of the Oakview PUD are immune under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act as a governmental function. No waiver 
of immunity applies. A specific non-waiver provision exists 
emphasizing that there is no waiver of immunity. 
This appeal# and plaintiff's argument, is controlled by the 
Utah Supreme Court's decisions in Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 
746 P.2d 763 (Ut. 1987) and Bennett v. Bow Valley Development 
Corp., 797 P.2d 419 (Ut. 1990) . Conditioning acceptance of a 
plat map on the developer making changes in the proposed plan 
does not remove the cloak of immunity. The conditions do not 
change the process from one of granting a license or permit to 
one of designing roads, designing safety enclosures around 
irrigation ditches, or overseeing funds held in trust. The 
Planning Commission and City Council do not become highway 
designers, civil engineers or bankers. They remain the 
governmental entity accepting a plat map and issuing a permit. 
II. Inspection and Maintenance of Private Road 
The controlling law is found in §63-30-10(1)(d) and the 
cases of Loveland, supra, and Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 478 
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P.2d 496 (Ut. 1970)• These cases, in particular, hold that a 
city or county cannot be held liable for the condition of private 
roads or private improvements. Oakview Drive is a private road. 
If plaintiff's argument is adopted, then every governmental 
entity in the State of Utah will be liable for any unreasonably 
dangerous condition existing at any place on any private road or 
right-of-way. This is not an overstatement of plaintiff's 
position. She admits in her argument that this should be the 
law. See excerpts from Appellant's Brief attached as Exhibit "4" 
to the Addendum. Neither Highland City, nor any other 
governmental entity can be held liable for unreasonably dangerous 
conditions existing on private roads or right-of-ways. 
Otherwise, the State of Utah could be held liable, civilly, for 
every mudhole, blind corner, single track road on every ranch in 
the state. This is not, and cannot be the law. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
I. HIGHLAND CITY IS IMMUNE 
FOR CLAIMS ARISING FROM ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLAT MAP 
As an affirmative defense, Highland City raised the 
governmental immunity contained in Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 and 
10(3) (1953, as amended). [All section references hereafter are 
to Utah Code Annotated.] Section 63-30-10(1)(c) states in 
pertinent part that: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury: 
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(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, 
suspension or revocation of or by the failure 
or refusal to issue, deny suspend or revoke 
any permit, license certificate, approval, 
order or similar authorization. 
Highland City's review and acceptance of the Oakview PUD 
plat map falls squarely within the provisions of §63-30-10(1) (c). 
Therefore, Highland City is immune from any claims of liability 
arising out of the approval process, or acceptance of, the 
Oakview PUD plat map. 
Attached as Exhibit "5" to the Addendum is a copy of the 
Utah Supreme Court decision in Loveland v. Orem City Corporation, 
746 P.2d 763 (Ut. 1987) . Loveland was a wrongful death action. 
Michael Loveland, a minor, drowned in an unfenced, cement-lined 
canal that bordered on the rear portion of the Loveland home on 
Lot 16, Plat B, Executive Estates, a subdivision located in Orem 
City. The facts disclosed that Orem City initially required the 
developer to enclose the canal in concrete where it crossed Plat 
A. The developer appealed that decision. The Orem City Council 
reversed the planning commission, changing the requirement to 
fencing instead of enclosing the canal in concrete. [Appellant 
misstates the facts in Loveland in her brief. See excerpts 
attached as Exhibit "6" to the Addendum]. Neither the Orem City 
Planning Commission nor the Orem City Council ever required the 
developer to fence or enclose the canal where it crossed Plat B 
or C. The developer fenced the canal on Plat A, but did not 
fence the canal on Plats B or C. Plaintiffs argued that, as a 
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result of the canal being open and unfenced on Plat B, Michael 
Loveland drowned. 
Michael Loveland's parents sued Orem City, among others. 
The Lovelands asserted that Orem City was negligent in the 
following activities: 
1. The city planning commission's receipt and 
analysis of the subdivision plat; 
2. The commission's recommendation to approve 
the platf subject to the installation of various 
improvements; 
3. The review and approval of the plat by the 
Orem City Council; 
4. The monitoring by Orem City employees of the 
construction and development of Executive Estates; 
5. The Orem City Planning Commission's 
recommendation (or lack thereof) to the Orem City 
Council that the canal be fenced in Plat B of Executive 
Estates; and 
6. Assuming such a recommendation was made, the 
failure of the city engineer or other city employees 
charged with supervising and monitoring construction of 
the subdivision to ensure that the fence was in fact 
constructed as was required. 
Loveland v. Orem City Corp, 746 P.2d at 775. 
The Supreme Court concluded that the facts in the case did 
not support claims under Items 4 and 6. The Court concluded that 
the activities enumerated in Items 1# 2, 3 and 5 fell within the 
governmental function, and therefore, the City of Orem was 
immune. See Loveland v. Orem City Corporation, 746 at 776. 
The Lovelands asserted that immunity had been waived under 
the provisions applying to public highways, roads and the like 
[§63-30-8] and for public buildings, structures, dams and other 
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public improvements [§63-30-9]. This is the essence of 
plaintiff's argument in the present case. The Utah Supreme Court 
rejected the argument, concluding: 
The fallacy in Lovelands' reasoning is their 
assumption that sections 63-30-8 and 63-30-9 
apply to defective, unsafe, or dangerous 
conditions on property which is not in 
"public use." This assumption is unsound. 
Although none of our cases have directly 
dealt with this issue, common sense dictates 
that adoption of the Lovelands' construction 
would go far beyond the intended scope of the 
waivers. And all of our case law is 
consistent with this decision. For example, 
in Stevens v. Salt Lake County the plaintiff 
was injured when he drove his motorbike from 
a pathway crossing a vacant lot onto an 
unimproved county road, where he was struck 
by a passing motorist. The plaintiff claimed 
that the weeds and brush growing alongside 
the county road on the vacant lot obscured 
his vision and caused the accident, thus 
constituting a "defective, unsafe, or 
dangerous condition" for which immunity was 
waived pursuant to section 63-30-8. In 
affirming the summary judgment in favor of 
Salt Lake County, the Court noted: 
Our concern is with the particular 
facts shown in this case: Where 
the pathway upon which plaintiff 
traveled and entered into Spring 
Lane was upon private property, and 
upon which were growing whatever 
weeds and brush obstructed his 
view. It would place a wholly 
impractical burden upon the 
counties if they had to assume the 
duty of correcting such conditions 
with respect to every private right 
of way that enters upon a public 
road. 
Additionally, none of our cases have 
suggested that a "public improvement" as is 
specified in §63-30-9 refers to private 
developments. 
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d at 777 [emphasis added]. 
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The activities of Highland City with respect to Oakview's 
planned unit development plat map are no different than Orem 
City's in the Loveland case. The Orem City Planning Commission 
conditioned the acceptance of Plat A, initially, on enclosing the 
irrigation ditch in concrete. If this had been done, the risk of 
children drowning from falling into the ditch, at least where it 
crossed the subdivision in Plat A would have been substantially 
reduced, if not eliminated. The developer appealed the concrete 
enclosure requirement to the Orem City Council. The city council 
changed the condition from one of concrete enclosure to fencing. 
Fencing the ditch, as opposed to fully enclosing it in concrete, 
probably reduced the effectiveness of the safety measure. 
Plat's B & C were presented to Orem City after Plat A. 
Although the canal bordered on the rear of certain lots on Plat 
B, including plaintiff's lot, neither Orem City Planning 
Commission nor the City Council required the canal to be fenced. 
Failing to insure that the canal was fenced definitely increased 
the risk of drowning to children in the subdivision. Orem City 
had notice of this risk from its review and analysis of Plat A. 
Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court held that Orem City was 
immune under §63-30-10(1) (c) for claims arising out of the 
review, analysis and acceptance of the plat maps. Orem City did 
not suddenly become liable for failing to properly design 
subdivision improvements. 
Attached as Exhibit "7" to the Addendum is a copy of the 
Utah Supreme Court decision in Bennett v. Bow Valley Development 
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Corp., 797 P.2d 419 (Ut. 1990) in which the Court re-affirmed 
Loveland. In Bow Valley, the plaintiffs asserted that Provo City 
was negligent for allowing improvement bonds to be released 
without requiring the developer to install the improvements. The 
Supreme Court noted: 
The inspection and acceptance of subdivision 
improvements are governmental functions for 
which immunity has not been waived. 
[Citing §63-30-10 & Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 
(Ut. 1987.] 
In Loveland, this Court concluded that the 
city planning commission's receipt and 
analysis of subdivision plat and approval 
were activities done in exercise of a 
governmental function. 
Therefore, the city planning commission's 
receipt and analysis of subdivision plat and 
approval were activities in the exercise of a 
governmental function and therefore were 
protected by governmental immunity. For the 
reasons we have heretofore enumerated, there 
is no waiver of immunity. 
Bennett v. Bow Valley Development Corporation, 797 P.2d at 423 
[emphasis added]. 
The burden was on the developer, Paul Frampton, in this case 
to insure that the intersection of Oakview Drive and 6000 West 
was reasonably safe. There is no evidence before this Court that 
the developer ever raised with Highland City or Utah County the 
issue of whether or not the movement of Oakview Drive further to 
the south created an unreasonable risk of injury to users of 
Oakview Drive and 6000 West. Ordinary common law places the 
burden on the developer to design and build the PUD so that there 
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are no unreasonable risks of injury from latent defects. See 
Love1and. id. 
If Highland City, as a condition to accepting the plat map 
requires the developer to place the access road in a potentially 
unsafe location/ then the burden is on the developer either to 
bring this to the attention of Highland City and ask for 
reconsideration/ or eliminate the potentially unsafe condition 
while complying with the requirements imposed by Highland City. 
There is no evidence in this case that the developer did either. 
Plaintiff argues, over and over again, that the proper 
interpretation of §63-30-8 & 10 requires this Court to give 
preference to the waiver of immunity in §63-30-8 when there is a 
conflict/ whether real or imagined/ with §63-30-10. See excerpts 
from Appellant's Brief attached as Exhibit "8" to the Addendum. 
At the time of the accident in this case/ §63-30-8 provided 
as follows: 
Immunity from all suits of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused by a 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of 
any highway/ roadf street/ alley# crosswalk/ 
sidewalk/ culvert/ tunnel/ bridge# viaduct or 
other structure located thereon. 
In 1991 the Legislature amended §63-30-8 to read as follows: 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more 
of the exceptions to waiver as set forth is 
Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for any 
injury caused by a defective/ unsafe/ or 
dangerous condition of any highway, road/ 
street/ alley/ crosswalk/ sidewalk/ culvert/ 
tunnel/ bridge, viaduct/ or other structure 
located on them. 
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Copies of both versions of §63-30-8 are attached as Exhibit "1" 
and "9" to the Addendum. It is not reasonable for plaintiff to 
argue that §63-30-8 be given preference over §63-30-10. The 
opposite is true. 
POINT II. 
HIGHLAND CITY HAD NO DUTY, AS A MATTER OF LAW 
TO MAINTAIN OAKVIEW DRIVE, A PRIVATE ROADWAY. 
The plaintiff next asserts that Highland City breached a 
duty with respect to the maintenance of Oakview Drive. The 
planned unit development plat map attached as Exhibit "2" to the 
Addendum shows that Oakview Drive is and was a private roadway. 
The roadway was dedicated to the Oakview Homeowner's Association 
at the time the PUD was created. Paul Frampton, the developer, 
testified in his deposition that maintenance of the road was the 
responsibility of the homeowners: 
Q. Is this subdivision a PUD? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does that mean the owners have responsibility for 
the road? 
A. You'd have to tell me what responsibility for the 
road means. All of the owners in there have the 
responsibility to maintain the road and keep weeds 
down and such things as that. As far as I know, 
that's all. 
[Depo of P. Frampton at 17:13-20.] 
Stevens v. Salt Lake County, supra, is controlling. The 
Court held: 
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It would place a wholly impractical burden on 
our counties if they had to assume the duty 
of correcting such conditions with respect to 
every private way that enters upon a public 
road. 
Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 478 P.2d at 499. Highland City is 
in the same position as Salt Lake County in the Stevens case. No 
duty can be imposed upon it with respect to the inspection or 
maintenance of Oakview Drive. 
POINT III. 
HIGHLAND CITY HAD NO RIGHT, NOR DUTY TO ERECT SIGNS ON 
EITHER OAKVIEW DRIVE OR 6000 WEST. 
As set forth above, Oakview Drive was a private road. 
Maintenance obligations, including that of signing, were placed 
on the Oakview homeowners. 
Oakview Drive intersected with 6000 West. It is undisputed 
that 6000 West is a county road at the point of this 
intersection. Highland City had no jurisdiction over the county 
road. See §17-5-3 8 which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(1) They [county] may . . . construct, 
maintain, control and manage county roads. . 
. . . 
Paul Hawker testified that it was the county's 
responsibility to place signs on 6000 West at the intersection of 
Oakview Drive. 
Q. (By Mr. Lund) Let's back up. You did not receive 
any notification from Highland City that this road 
was going to be connected to a county road, did 
you? 
A. No. 
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Q. Yet you still have the responsibility to properly 
sign that section of the road; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
[Depo of P. Hawker at 30:14-20.] 
See also, Stevens v. Salt Lake County, supra. 
POINT IV. 
LACK OF STOP SIGN NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE 
The fact that there was not a stop sign for traffic on 
Oakview Drive intending to enter onto 6000 West is not a material 
issue in this case. The plaintiff testified that she knew that 
she was required to stop before entering 6000 West from Oakview 
Drive. She further testified that she did stop on the day of the 
accident: 
Q. Did you know that the people using Oakview Drive 
planning to go onto 6000 West were required to 
stop at the intersection before they went onto 
6000 West? 
A. I know that since I lived there, you know. I 
always stopped. Not -- you know, it's kind of 
dangerous, you know, the blind spot kind of --
it's hard not to look, so I assume they would 
stop. I didn't know they -- I never thought about 
that they had to -- you know, never thought about 
it like that, but I assumed that they would 
have to because I always had to. 
Q. (By Mr. Ferguson) How long were you stopped at 
the intersection, do you know? Or let me back it 
up. You definitely stopped at the intersection 
the day of the accident? 
A. I don't remember the whole accident, the whole 
incident, but I always stop, so I would, you know, 
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assume that I stopped. I couldn't -- I can't 
prove that I stopped, but I remember always 
stopping, so... 
[Depo M. de Villiers at p. 24:8-17 and p. 36:3-10.] 
POINT V. 
HIGHLAND CITY IS IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR FAILURE 
TO MAKE INSPECTIONS. 
To the extent that the plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint 
seeks to hold Highland City liable for failure to inspect the 
intersection of Oakview and 6000 West, Highland City is immune 
from such liability pursuant to the provisions of §63-30-10(1) 
which provide in pertinent part as follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury which is 
proximately caused by a negligent act or 
omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of the employment except if the injury 
arises out of: 
(d) Failure to make an inspection or by 
making an inadequate or negligent inspection. 
Highland City is immune from any liability arising out of an 
assertion that Highland City should have inspected this 
intersection. See also, Stevens v. Salt Lake County, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
Highland City is entitled to governmental immunity pursuant 
to §63-30-10 (1) (c) for all the allegations made against it by 
plaintiff regarding the plat map and PUD approval. Highland City 
owed no duty to maintain Oakview Drive. Highland City is immune 
under §63-30-10 (1) (d) for all claims regarding a failure to 
inspect. Highland City did not own Oakview Drive nor 6000 West. 
Oakview Drive was owned by the homeowner's association. 6000 
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West was owned by the Utah County. Therefore, Highland City had 
no right, nor duty to maintain, inspect, or sign either of those 
roads. 
Finally, the allegations with respect to signage on Oakview 
Drive are not material. The plaintiff testified that she knew 
that she had to stop at the intersection of Oakview Drive and 
6000 West. She said that, on the day of the accident, she would 
have followed her normal practice and stopped at the intersection 
of Oakview Drive and 6000 West. 
Highland City respectfully submits that the trial court's 
Order granting Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment should 
be affirmed. 
DATED thiso?Q& day of March, 1993. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
City of Highland 
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Tab 3 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-8 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Construction and application. 
The waiver of immunity from suit "for the 
recovery of any property real or personal or for 
the possession thereof does not include an ac-
tion for damages for impairment of access to 
property caused by construction of highway 
underpass; this act should be strictly construed 
to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it 
only as clearly expressed therein. Holt v. Utah 
State Rd. Comm., 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 
(1973). 
63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent op-
eration of motor vehicles — Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury result-
ing from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or other 
equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employ-
ment, or under color of authority; provided, however, that this section shall 
not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while 
being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 7; 1983, ch. 
129, § 5. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Admiralty jurisdiction: maritime 
nature of tort — modern cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 
105. 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defec-
tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, 
bridges, or other structures. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other 
structure located thereon. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Complaint, sufficiency of allegations. 
Construction. 
Contributory negligence. 
Dangerous objects. 
Discretionary function. 
Ice and snow on sidewalk. 
Manholes. 
Negligent construction. 
New duties not created. 
Nondelegable duty. 
Private developments. 
Traffic signs. 
Complaint, sufficiency of allegations. 
Claim for injuries "sustained on or about 
January 15, 1902, while walking on the side-
walk along First West street between Seventh 
and Eighth South, * * * through the negligence 
of the city in suffering * * * a fence * * * to be 
on said sidewalk," not having misled the city, 
was sufficiently definite. Connor v. Salt Lake 
City, 28 Utah 248, 78 P. 479 (1904). 
Where plaintiff sustained damages to his au-
tomobile on city streets, and presented a claim 
for '"necessary repairs to automobile $133," he 
cannot claim and recover additional damages 
for $1,000 for its "depreciation in value and 
525 
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Tab 4 
It is beyond dispute that a person may maintain an action 
against a governmental entity for injuries which are proximately 
caused by the defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of a public 
road. Biaelow v. Inaersoll. 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980); Andrus v. 
State. 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975); Carroll v. State Road Commission. 
496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972). However, 11500 North is a private road 
which is in the public use. The issue is whether there is any 
distinction in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) between governmental 
negligence in relation to a public road and negligence in relation 
to a private road. 
Plaintiff respectfully asserts that the purpose of Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989), as reflected in the statute's plain 
language, is to provide relief to all motorists for governmental 
negligence in relation to roads and streets, without respect to 
whether the road is publicly owned or privately owned but in the 
public use. Plaintiff asserts that no distinction between public 
and private roads should be made absent a showing by Highland City 
that such was the intent of the Legislature. 
The definition of "highway" in the Motor Vehicle Act 
supports this conclusion. "Highway" is defined as any place which 
"is open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, for 
vehicular traffic." Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102 (1988). The 
definition of "highway" does not focus on the ownership of the 
13 
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James B. LOVELAND and Lynette Loveland, 
individually and as personal 
representatives of the Estate of Michael 
Loveland, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
OREM CITY CORP.; North Union Irrigation 
Co., a Utah corporation; and Brown 
Brothers, a partnership, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 19942. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 23, 1987. 
Purchasers brought action against land developer, 
canal operator, and city for wrongful death of child 
in canal bordering property. The Fourth District 
Court, Utah County, J. Robert Bullock, J., granted 
summary judgment in favor of defendants. 
Purchasers appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, 
C.J., held that: (1) developer, that had subdivided 
land and sold it to house builder, owed no duty to 
disclose canal to builder or purchasers; (2) canal 
operator owed no duty to drowning child; and (3) 
city was immune from liability. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, Associate C.J., concurred in part, 
dissented in part and filed opinion. 
Durham, J., concurred in part, dissented in part and 
filed opinion. 
[1] NEGLIGENCE <&=> 54 
272k54 
Land developer owed no duty to intermediate owner 
to disclose canal bordering property and was not 
liable for drowning of purchasers' child, where 
intermediate owner knew of canal and its potential 
hazard and had taken possession of land. 
[2] NEGLIGENCE <£=> 54 
272k54 
Existence of express agreement was not exception to 
rule that vendor was not liable for physical harm 
caused by dangerous condition to vendee and others 
while upon land after vendee has taken possession, 
but was simply another relationship out of which 
duty of care could arise. 
[3] APPEAL AND ERROR &* 170(1) 
30kl70(l) 
Purchasers failed to preserve for appeal claim that 
land developer had entered into express agreement 
with city to fence canal, where purchasers did not 
raise issue below. 
[4] NEGLIGENCE <&= 39 
272k39 
Land developer, that had subdivided property and 
sold it to house builder, was not liable on nuisance 
theory for drowning of purchasers' son in canal 
bordering property. 
[5] FRAUDS 17 
184kl7 
Land developer owes no duty to purchaser to 
disclose deficiencies that are easily discernible 
during ordinary and reasonable investigation, but 
owes duty to disclose condition of which developer 
knows or should know and which makes 
subdivided lots unsuitable for residential building. 
[6] FRAUD <s=> 17 
184kl7 
Land developer, that subdivided property and sold it 
to builder of house, did not breach duty to disclose 
existence of canal bordering property, even if canal 
made lot unsuitable for residential building 
purposes, where builder knew of canal and danger 
it posed. U.C.A.1953, 57-11-1 to 57-11-21, 57-11-
5(1, 3, 4), 57-11-17, 57-ll-17(l)(c). 
[7] NEGLIGENCE <&* 54 
272k54 
Land developer, that had subdivided property and 
had sold it to builder of house, was not liable on 
strict liability theory for drowning of purchasers' 
child in canal bordering property. U.C.A.1953, 57-
11-1 to 57-11-21, 57-11-5(1, 3, 4). 
[8] WATERS AND WATER COURSES <§=> 260 
405k260 
Operator of irrigation canal owed no duty to child, 
who drowned in canal, and was not liable for 
drowning under attractive nuisance doctrine. 
[9] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <S=> 724 
268k724 
City planning commission's receipt and analysis of 
subdivision plat, commission's recommendation to 
approve plat, city council's review and approval of 
plat, and commission's recommendation for failure 
to recommend fencing of canal bordering 
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residential property were activities done in exercise 
of "governmental function," and, thus, city was 
immune from liability for drowning of child, 
unless immunity was waived. U.C.A.1953, 10-2-
401, 10-9-1, 10-9-4, 63-30-1 to 60-30-38. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
[10] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <&= 827(2) 
268k827(2) 
Waiver of sovereign immunity for injury caused by 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any 
culvert and for injury caused from dangerous or 
defective condition of public structure or reservoir 
did not apply to defective, unsafe, or dangerous 
conditions on private property and did not apply to 
privately owned and operated canal bordering 
residential property. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-8, 63-30-
9. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
[11] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <S^ 753(1) 
268k753(l) 
City enjoyed sovereign immunity with respect to 
representations made by city employees that fence 
would be installed on canal bordering residential 
property and with respect to approval of 
subdivision plat, and, thus, city was not liable for 
drowning of child; injuries arising out of approval 
of subdivision plat and misrepresentation by 
employee were excluded from waiver of sovereign 
immunity for injury proximately caused by 
negligent act or omission of employee within scope 
of employment. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-8, 63-30-9, 
63-30-10(1), (l)(c, f). 
*764 Stephen L. Henriod, Richard K. Hincks, 
Douglas K. Pehrson, David L. Rasmussen, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
Allan L. Larson, Salt Lake City, for Orem City 
Corp. 
J. Anthony Eyre, Robert H. Rees, Salt Lake City, 
for North Union Irr. Co. 
Roger H. Bullock, Salt Lake City, for Brown Bros. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiffs initiated this wrongful death action after 
Michael Loveland, their three-year-old son, 
drowned in an irrigation canal. Plaintiffs seek 
reversal of three district court orders granting 
defendants' motions for summary judgment. We 
affirm. 
I 
We review the facts of this case in the light most 
favorable to plaintiffs. [FN1] Defendant North 
Union Irrigation Company (North Union) was 
incorporated in April 1883. At that time, it began 
operating the North Union Irrigation Ditch (canal) 
in Utah County, and it continues doing so today. 
FN1. See Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 
1360, 1361 n. 1 (Utah 1986). 
In July 1976, defendant Brown Brothers became 
involved in the development of the Executive 
Estates subdivision in Orem City, Utah. The 
subdivision is comprised of three plats: plat A, 
plat B, and plat C. The canal borders portions of 
all three plats. 
The Orem City Planning Commission originally 
mandated that the Executive Estates plat A 
subdivision plan provide for the covering of the 
canal where it crossed that plat to provide the 
required setback. Brown Brothers subsequently 
appealed this decision to the Orem City Council, 
and eventually the Council changed the 
specification to require fencing of the canal in plat 
A. Neither the Planning Commission nor the City 
Council ever expressly required the covering or the 
fencing of the canal in plats B or C. 
Following the development of lot sixteen in plat B 
of the subdivision, Brown Brothers sold the lot to 
John Atkinson, dba Jacor, Inc. Jacor in turn 
constructed a home on the lot and then put the 
property up for sale. 
In October 1978, plaintiffs (Lovelands) were 
shopping for a house. At that time, they examined 
the house built by Jacor on lot sixteen. While at 
the site, the Lovelands noticed North Union's 
canal that ran through the lot and parallel to the 
rear lot line. The Lovelands observed that the 
concrete *765 canal had sloping sides and a flat 
bottom and was about ten feet wide. At the time 
the Lovelands inspected the property, there was no 
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water flowing in the canal. When the Lovelands 
voiced their concern about the canal to Atkinson, 
he told them not to be concerned because a former 
real estate listing agent had a document showing 
that the developers were required by Orem City to 
fence the canal. Mr. Loveland, himself a building 
contractor, called the agent, and she confirmed that 
such a document existed. However, the Lovelands 
never saw the document, which in actuality only 
referred to plat A of the subdivision. 
Thereafter, Mr. Loveland spoke with a neighboring 
property owner, Gary Starr, who told Mr. 
Loveland that fencing the canal was a subdivision 
plat requirement. Starr also informed Mr. 
Loveland that although he did not know when the 
fence would be erected, Orem City had said it would 
be installed before water was allowed in the canal. 
The Lovelands subsequently purchased the 
property from Jacor and moved into their new home 
in December 1978. 
During the winter months, the Lovelands were told 
by Starr that Orem City was claiming it had no 
obligation to fence the canal, and an ad hoc 
neighborhood committee was subsequently formed 
to deal, in part, with concerns about getting the 
canal fenced. Starr became the committee's 
spokesman, and the Lovelands claim he had 
numerous contacts with North Union between 
January and May of 1979. The Lovelands also 
claim North Union indicated that the canal was 
going to be fenced. The committee prepared a 
petition for presentation to the Orem City Council. 
The petition sought improvement of the 
subdivision's roads and Council assistance to get 
the canal fenced. However, the City Council was 
never presented with the petition. The petition was 
subsequently presented to Orem City's mayor. 
Thereafter, the roads were improved, but nothing 
was done about the canal. The Lovelands had no 
direct contact or personal dealings with the City or 
any of its officers or representatives. 
In April 1979, Mr. Loveland had a conversation 
with a North Union water master and was told that 
North Union was trying to work with Orem City to 
get the fence into place. On May 1, 1979, water 
began flowing in the canal. The Lovelands claim 
they were not given advance notice that the canal 
was to be filled. On May 11, 1979, Mr. Loveland 
again spoke to the same water master and this time 
was told that the company was trying to pressure 
Orem City into installing a fence. 
On May 18, 1979, almost three weeks after Mr. 
Loveland noticed water flowing in the canal, 
Michael Loveland, while unsupervised, walked out 
the back door of the Lovelands' home, across the 
back yard to the cement bank of the canal, and 
either climbed down or slipped into the water and 
was drowned. After the incident, the Lovelands 
requested $200 that was escrowed when they 
purchased their home for fencing the canal on their 
lot and, together with their neighbors' financial 
help, fenced the canal in plats B and C. 
Counts one and two of the Lovelands' amended 
complaint, directed at all three defendants, were 
grounded on strict liability and negligence theories, 
respectively. Count three of the complaint, 
directed only at Orem City and Brown Brothers, 
was based upon an implied warranty theory. On 
appeal, the Lovelands only advance the theories 
found in the first two counts. 
II 
BROWN BROTHERS 
The Lovelands' first point is that factual questions 
concerning Brown Brothers' obligation to fence the 
canal should have precluded entry of summary 
judgment in favor of that defendant. This position, 
however, presupposes the existence of a duty owed 
by Brown Brothers to Michael Loveland. It is 
axiomatic that one may not be liable to another in 
tort absent a duty. [FN2] *766 The question of 
whether a duty exists is a question of law. [FN3] 
As always, resolution of this issue begins with an 
examination of the legal relationships between the 
parties, followed by an analysis of the duties 
created by these relationships. 
FN2. See Moreno v. Marrs, 102 N.M. 373, 
376, 695 P.2d 1322, 1325, 1328 
(N.M.Ct.App.1984), cert, quashed sub nom. 
Corral, Inc. v. Marris, 102 N.M. 412, 696 
P.2d 1005 (N.M. 1985). 
FN3. Weber, 725 P.2d at 1363. 
In this case, three possible duty-creating 
relationships are at issue. The Lovelands 
principally depend on their status as foreseeable 
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purchasers from Brown Brothers, which, as a land 
developer, conducted activities to improve raw 
acreage into residential building lots. Alternatively, 
a relationship is said to have arisen out of an 
agreement between Brown Brothers and Orem City 
whereby the former was to fence the canal. 
Finally, the relationship between the Lovelands as 
subvendees and Brown Brothers as a vendor must be 
analyzed. It is with this latter relationship that we 
begin our analysis. 
The "somewhat murky" development of the law 
surrounding predecessor landowners' liability has 
given rise to at least three schools of thought 
regarding recovery for postconveyance injuries 
occurring on private property due to natural or 
artificial conditions existing thereon when the 
present owner or possessor assumed control. [FN4] 
The California Supreme Court, although in a 
different context, recently discussed these three 
views: The older general rule has been that the 
seller of realty is not subject to liability for bodily 
injury suffered by third persons after the vendee has 
taken possession. This rule has held true even 
though the vendor may have been responsible for 
creating a dangerous condition on the land which 
caused the injury. An intermediate position is that 
espoused in the Restatement (Second) of Torts and 
in Professor Keaton and Prosser's text on tort law 
which provides that the predecessor in title may in 
certain situations be subject to liability for injuries 
to third persons that arise after he or she 
relinquishes title. The scope of this exposure will 
be examined more thoroughly below. Under the 
third view, the predecessor in title remains subject 
to liability until the dangerous condition created by 
him has been corrected. [FN5] 
FN4. Preston v. Goldman, 42 Cal.3d 108, 114-
-15, 720 P.2d 476, 479, 227 Cal.Rptr. 817, 
820 (1986) (en banc). 
FN5. Id. at 115-16, 720 P.2d at 479-80, 227 
Cal.Rptr. at 820-21. 
[1] In its defense, Brown Brothers, both here and 
below, advances that portion of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts s 352 (1965) which contains the 
older general rule. That provision provides, in 
pertinent part: "[A] vendor of land is not subject 
to liability for physical harm caused to his vendee or 
others while upon the land after the vendee has 
taken possession by any dangerous condition, 
whether natural or artificial, which existed at the 
time that the vendee took possession." This rule, 
primarily attributed to the ancient doctrine of 
caveat emptor, is said to have retained its force for a 
variety of reasons, including public policy 
concerns, [FN6] the importance attached to deeds, 
[FN7] the lack of standards of quality or use of 
land, and the fact that vendees generally make 
prepurchase investigations of real estate and 
therefore are assumed to accept it "as is." [FN8] 
With respect to this last noted rationale, it has been 
said: 
FN6. Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 362, 
270 S.W. 66, 70 (1925). 
FN7. Id. 
FN8. W. Keaton & W. Prosser, Prosser & 
Keaton on the Law of Torts s 64, at 447 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
[I]n the absence of express agreement or 
misrepresentation, the purchaser is expected to 
make his own examination and draw his own 
conclusions as to the condition of the land; and 
the vendor is, in general, not liable for any harm 
resulting to him or others from any defect existing at 
the time of transfer. [FN9] 
FN9. Id. (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). 
Comment a of the Reporter's notes to section 
352 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(1965) states: Under the ancient doctrine of 
caveat emptor, the original rule was that, in 
the absence of express agreement, the vendor 
of land was not liable to his vendee, or a 
fortiori to any other person, for the condition 
of the land existing at the time of transfer. 
As to sales of land this rule has retained much 
of its original force.... This is perhaps 
because great importance always has been 
attached to the deed of conveyance, which is 
taken to represent the full agreement of the 
parties, and to exclude all other terms and 
liabilities. The vendee is required to make his 
own inspection of the premises, and the 
vendor is not responsible to him for their 
defective condition, existing at the time of 
transfer. (Emphasis added.) 
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*767 [2, 3] Despite the varying approaches 
discussed above and the exceptions discussed more 
thoroughly below, the Lovelands do not dispute the 
soundness of the above-quoted portion of the 
Restatement rule. Instead, they contend that an 
express agreement existed under which Brown 
Brothers was required by Orem City to fence the 
canal. The existence of an express agreement is 
not, as suggested by the Lovelands, an exception to 
the Restatement's rule, but simply another 
relationship out of which a duty of care may arise. 
In any event, the record does not reflect that the 
Lovelands raised this issue below. In fact, in their 
opposition to Brown Brothers' renewed motion for 
summary judgment, the Lovelands argued that 
fencing plat B was "implicitly required" by Orem 
City. The Lovelands may not raise the "express 
agreement" argument for the first time on appeal. 
[FN 10] 
FN10. See, e.g., Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper 
Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 
1986). 
Nor is the Lovelands' related argument, which 
attempts to draw analogies to landlord-tenant 
cases, well taken. They claim that the basis of such 
cases is the landlord's control of the premises. 
The Lovelands conclude that since the principle 
limiting negligence in landlord-tenant and vendor-
vendee cases is the same (that is, control), the issue 
of Brown Brothers' control over the subject 
property should have gone to the jury. [FN11] 
FN11. The retaining of control as a basis for 
imposing a duty on landlords has been 
discussed in many cases. E.g., Williams v. 
Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985); 
Ayala v. B & B Realty Co., 32 Conn.Sup. 58, 
337 A.2d 330, 332 (Conn.Super.Ct.1974). 
[4] Although attempts to establish vendor liability 
by analogy to landlord- tenant cases have been 
rejected in the past, [FN 12] one of the more 
pragmatic rationales for the above-quoted portion 
of the Restatement's rule is that vendor liability 
should be coextensive with possession and/or 
control and the corresponding ability to prevent 
exposure to liability. [FN 13] Thus, even where 
bare legal title has been divested, liability has been 
imposed where a vendor continued to exercise 
possession or control. [FN 14] Here, however, 
there is no reasonable dispute regarding the fact that 
Brown Brothers had no right to control, supervise, 
or otherwise enter upon the Lovelands' property. 
[FN 15] *768 Thus, the claim that a factual question 
exists is without merit. 
FN12. E.g., Combow v. Kansas City Ground 
Inv. Co., 358 Mo. 934, 939, 218 S.W.2d 
539, 541 (1949); Sarnicandro v. Lake Dev., 
Inc., 55 NJ.Super. 475, 480, 151 A.2d 48, 
51 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1959). 
FN13. See Brock v. Rogers & Babler, Inc., 
536 P.2d 778, 782 (Alaska 1975) 
(Restatement (Second) of Torts s 352 (1965) 
grounded upon policy which seeks to limit 
liability to persons in possession and control of 
property); cf. Preston, 42 Cal.3d at 117-20, 
125-26, 720 P.2d at 481- 83, 487, 227 
Cal.Rptr. at 822-24, 828 (absence of 
possession and control justifies departure 
from Cal.Civ.Code s 1714). 
FN 14. Marsden v. Eastern Gas & Fuel 
Assocs., 7 Mass.App. 27, 385 N.E.2d 528, 
530 (1979); cf. Ward v. Enevold, 504 P.2d 
1108, 1110 (Colo.Ct.App.1972) (not selected 
for official publication) (tenant liable for slip 
and fall on parking lot extending onto unleased 
property), cert, denied, Jan. 15, 1973. 
FN 15. The Lovelands' reliance upon Corcoran 
v. Village of Libertyville, 73 111.2d 316, 22 
111.Dec. 701, 383 N.E.2d 177 (1978), is 
unpersuasive. Unlike this Court, the Illinois 
Supreme Court has abolished the attractive 
nuisance doctrine and has established a test of 
foreseeability in its place. Corcoran's 
extension of a duty to nonowners/ 
nonpossessors was based on the court's new 
foreseeability test. Compare Cope v. Doe, 102 
I11.2d 278, 285-86, 80 111.Dec. 40, 43-44, 
464 N.E.2d 1023, 1026-27 (1984), with 
LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 132 
Ill.App.3d 607, 612-14, 88 III.Dec. 102, 105-
-06, 478 N.E.2d 417, 420-21 (1985). The 
Lovelands' suggestion that liability may be 
grounded upon nuisance theory is without 
merit for several reasons, including the fact 
that Brown Brothers relinquished possession 
and control long before the incident at hand. 
See Ayala, 337 A.2d at 332; Sarnicandro, 55 
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N.J.Super. at 480, 151 A.2d at 51; 
Restatement (Second) of Torts s 373 (1965). 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts has recognized 
two exceptions to the caveat emptor approach 
embodied in that portion of section 352 quoted 
above. The first exception involves a vendor's 
duty to disclose to the vendee any concealed 
conditions known to the vendor which involve an 
unreasonable danger. [FN 16] The second 
exception is that a vendor owes a duty for a 
reasonable time to those outside the land who are 
injured after the sale by a dangerous condition on 
the land. [FN 17] In this case, we are not dealing 
with a person who was outside the land at the time 
of the injury. Nor are we dealing with a concealed 
condition. Moreover, under both of the above 
exceptions, knowledge of the defect on the part of 
the vendee relieves the vendor of any duty or 
liability. [FN 18] 
FN 16. Restatement (Second) of Torts s 353 
(1965) provides: (1) A vendor of land who 
conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any 
condition, whether natural or artificial, which 
involves unreasonable risk to persons on the 
land, is subject to liability to the vendee and 
others upon the land with the consent of the 
vendee or his subvendee for physical harm 
caused by the condition after the vendee has 
taken possession, if (a) the vendee does not 
know or have reason to know of the condition 
or the risk involved, and (b) the vendor 
knows or has reason to know of the condition, 
and realizes or should realize the risk 
involved, and has reason to belief that the 
vendee will not discover the condition or 
realize the risk. (2) If the vendor actively 
conceals the condition, the liability stated in 
Subsection (1) continues until the vendee 
discovers it and has reasonable opportunity to 
take effective precautions against it. 
Otherwise the liability continues only until 
the vendee has had reasonable opportunity to 
discover the condition and to take such 
precautions. 
FN 17. Restatement (Second) of Torts s 373 
(1965). 
FN18. See Christy v. Prestige Builders, Inc., 
415 Mich. 684, 694-96, 329 N.W.2d 748, 
752 (1982); see also Higgenbottom v. Noreen, 
586 F.2d 719, 720-21 (9th Cir.1978); Lake 
v. United States, 522 F.Supp. 166, 168 
(N.D.111. 1981); Aitken v. Starr, 99 N.M. 
598, 601, 661 P.2d 498, 501 (N.M.Ct.App.), 
cert, denied, 99 N.M. 644, 662 P.2d 645 
(1983); Restatement (Second) of Torts ss 
12(1), 353 comments b, d (1965). But see 
Farragher v. City of New York, 26 A.D.2d 
494, 275 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1966), affd, 21 
N.Y.2d 756, 288 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 N.E.2d 
218 (1968). 
The record reflects that Brown Brothers' vendee, 
John Atkinson, knew of the canal and its 
dangerous characteristics. In his deposition, James 
Loveland testified that when he expressed to 
Atkinson his and his wife's concern over the 
exposed canal, Atkinson told him not to worry 
because the canal would be fenced. Additionally, 
$200 was placed in escrow to provide for fencing 
the canal, and James Loveland testified that these 
funds may have been withheld from Atkinson's 
proceeds. This testimony, in conjunction with that 
concerning the physical dimensions of the canal 
and the nature of the development of the property, 
is sufficient to infer that Atkinson knew of the canal 
and the potential hazard it created. Therefore, 
Brown Brothers owed no duty pursuant to the 
exceptions to the general rule found in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. [FN 19] 
FN19. See Christy, 415 Mich, at 694-96, 329 
N.W.2dat753. 
The Lovelands contend that they did not sue Brown 
Brothers in its capacity as a vendor of lot sixteen, 
but rather as the developer of the property. Brown 
Brothers, without authority, claims that this 
distinction is of no legal consequence. We 
disagree. Although there has been no wholesale 
importation of the principles underlying products 
liability into the real estate context, some 
exceptions have arisen where the prior landowner 
was a professional developer. [FN20] 
FN20. Preston, 42 Cal.3d at 117 n. 3, 720 
P.2d at 481 n. 3, 227 Cal.Rptr. at 822 n. 3. 
But see, e.g., Chapman v. Lily Cache 
Builders, Inc., 48 Ill.App.3d 919, 922-23, 6 
Ill.Dec. 176, 179, 362 N.E.2d 811, 814 
(1977). That such exceptions might exist is 
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supported by our cases limiting application of 
the "accepted-work doctrine." Compare 
Williams, 699 P.2d at 729, with Leininger v. 
Stearns-Roger Manf. Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 41, 
404P.2d33,36(1965). 
The Lovelands claim that a developer is subject to 
liability for physical harm or death resulting from 
its negligence in the development of real estate. In 
support of this claim, they cite several cases which 
*769 recognize that a duty of care arises out of a 
building contractor's and/or developer's contract 
upon which an action in tort may lie for negligence 
which causes personal injury and varying types of 
property damage. [FN21] These cases state the 
scope of this duty in many ways. Additionally, the 
Lovelands rely on Justice Cardozo's opinion in 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., [FN22] which in 
essence held that a duty may exist irrespective of a 
contractual relationship. [FN23] 
FN21. E.g., Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 
Colo.App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972). 
FN22. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
FN23. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. 
[5] Although MacPherson involved the duty of a 
supplier of chatties, modern courts have held that 
purchasers of real estate may recover from a 
contractor for his or her negligence despite the lack 
of privity. [FN24] However, neither Brown 
Brothers nor the Lovelands have adequately briefed 
the Court concerning whether a nonbuilding 
subdivider owes a duty to sub vendees and, if so, the 
scope of that duty. The Wyoming Supreme Court 
is one of the courts which have recently dealt with 
this issue. In Anderson v. Bauer, [FN25] a 
defendant developer purchased raw acreage and 
subdivided the same into residential building lots. 
These lots were in turn sold to defendant builders 
who constructed houses thereon that were later 
purchased by eight plaintiff owners. The plaintiffs 
sued after they experienced water seepage into their 
basements. [FN26] In reversing the judgment 
against the defendant developer, the court stated: 
FN24. Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 
663 P.2d 1041, 1044-45 (Colo. 1983) (en 
banc) (and cases cited therein); Kristek v. 
Catron, 7 Kan.App.2d 495, 644 P.2d 480 
(1982). 
FN25. 681 P.2d 1316 (Wyo.1984). 
FN26. Id. at 1319-20. 
Development of new land into subdivided lots for 
building, with streets, sewer, water and utilities is 
a necessary and beneficial activity that ought to be 
encouraged. The developer ought to also have 
responsibility for his activities. Yet, he should not 
be subject to liability for all misfortune that might 
befall a purchaser. Thus, it is reasonable that, 
where land is subdivided and sold for the purpose 
of constructing residential dwelling houses, the 
developer has a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for 
construction of some type of ordinary, average 
dwelling house and he must disclose to his purchaser 
any condition which he knows or reasonably ought 
to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for 
such residential building. He has a further duty to 
disclose, upon inquiry, information he has 
developed in the course of the subdivision process 
which is relevant to suitability of the land for its 
expected use. [FN27] 
FN27. Id. at 1323 (emphasis added). 
We do not interpret this duty to extend to 
deficiencies in residential building lots that are 
easily discernible during an ordinary and reasonable 
investigation by a purchaser and that are in fact 
known of by the purchaser. [FN28] The limitation 
seems necessary inasmuch as purchasers are often 
willing to accept known deficiencies in land in 
exchange for a lower purchase price. This, of 
course, does not follow with regard to latent defects, 
those which a buyer cannot reasonably be expected 
to discover. [FN29] 
FN28. The result of applying this 
interpretation is not inconsistent with the 
results in cases similar to the one at bar. E.g., 
Green Springs, Inc. v. Calvera, 239 So.2d 
264, 265 (Fla.1970); Village Dev. Co. v. 
Filice, 90 Nev. 305, 307-08, 526 P.2d 83, 84 
(1974). 
FN29. Cf. Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc., 663 
P.2d at 1045-46 (allowing buyer of used 
home to recover against builder on negligence 
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theory only for latent defects). 
The duty defined by the Wyoming court and our 
interpretation thereof is consistent with existing 
Utah law. Although not raised by the parties, 
perhaps due to its nonappiicability by reason of 
reliance on an exemption, Utah has enacted the 
"Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act." [FN30] 
Although not controlling in the instant case, *770 
its provisions are persuasive in fashioning the duty 
of a subdivider to his vendees. Unless exempted by 
Utah Code Ann. s 57-11-4 (Supp.1987), Utah 
Code Ann. s 57-11-5(1), (4) (Supp.1987) requires 
that subdivided land be registered before it can be 
sold and that the purchaser receive a "public 
offering statement" before the disposition of the 
land. [FN31] Utah Code Ann. s 57-11-7 (1986) 
provides, in pertinent part: "(1) Every public 
offering statement shall disclose fully and accurately 
the physical characteristics of the subdivided lands 
offered and shall make known to prospective 
purchasers all unusual and material circumstances or 
features affecting the subdivided lands." 
(Emphasis added.) Utah Code Ann. s 57-11-17 
(1986) provides in part: 
FN30. Utah Code Ann. ss 57-11-1 to -21 
(1986 & Supp.1987). 
FN31. We are mindful that subsection (3) does 
not allow civil liability for failing to deliver 
such a statement. 
(1) Any person who: ...; (c) in disposing of 
subdivided lands, omits a material fact required to 
be stated in a registration statement, public 
offering statement, statement of record or public 
report, necessary to make the statements made not 
misleading; is liable as provided in this section to 
the purchaser unless, in the case of an untruth or 
omission, it is proved that the purchaser knew of the 
untruth or omission or that the person offering or 
disposing of subdivided lands did not know and in 
the exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known of the untruth or omission. Clearly the 
imposition of liability pursuant to subsection 57-11-
17(l)(c) is limited in part to negligent or 
intentional omissions made in the course of the 
disposition of real estate and requires that the 
vendee did not know or could not have known of 
the omission. The duty enunciated by the Wyoming 
court in Anderson is consistent with this scheme. 
The above analysis was utilized in Stepanov v. 
Gavrilovich, [FN32] wherein the Alaska Supreme 
Court discussed the duties subdividers owe to their 
vendees. Stepanov was in turn relied upon by the 
court in Anderson. [FN33] 
FN32. 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979). 
FN33. 681 P.2dat 1322. 
[6] Assuming that the canal constituted a hazard 
which made lot sixteen unsuitable for residential 
building purposes, all the evidence supports the 
conclusion that Atkinson knew of the canal and the 
danger it imposed. Moreover, although not 
necessary to this analysis, the Lovelands were well 
aware of the problem. We hold that there was no 
evidence to establish that Brown Brothers breached 
the above-described duty of care. [FN34] 
FN34. The Lovelands' reliance upon Fisher v. 
Morrison Homes, Inc., 109 Cal.App.3d 131, 
167 Cal.Rptr. 133 (1980), is misplaced. That 
case clearly turned upon the unclear 
distribution of liability between the public and 
private developers which arises as a 
consequence of dedicating land which is part 
of a subdivision. Id. at 136, 167 Cal.Rptr. at 
135-36. 
The Lovelands alternatively claim that Brown 
Brothers may be held liable upon a strict liability 
theory. Specifically, the Lovelands rely upon our 
adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts s 
402A (1965) in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco 
Steel Co. [FN35] They claim that the doctrine of 
strict liability has been repeatedly applied to real 
estate transactions. 
FN35. 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979). 
[7] The doctrine of strict liability has not been 
applied to residential subdividers in Utah. 
Although such a theory has some appeal from a risk-
spreading standpoint and because of the obvious 
reliance house buyers place on developer expertise, 
we are not persuaded that the doctrine should be 
applied in this case. The Lovelands' briefing is 
simply inadequate. They have not provided any 
serious analysis of the issue, nor have they provided 
the Court with the necessary underpinnings for 
such a rule. 
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*771 All of the cases cited by the Lovelands, with 
the exception of one, deal only with the mass 
housing developer or the installation of faulty 
products into homes. Only in the California case of 
Avner v. Longridge Estates [FN36] did a court 
rule that a "manufacturer" of a residential lot may 
be held strictly liable in tort for damage suffered by 
the owner as a proximate result of defects in the 
manufacturing process. [FN37] 
FN36. 272 Cal.App.2d 607, 77 Cal.Rptr. 633 
(1969). 
FN37. 77 Cal.Rptr. at 639. 
Although the early progeny of Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products, Inc., [FN38] which established 
the doctrine of strict liability in the state of 
California, held the doctrine inapplicable to real 
property, more recent California cases have eroded 
this distinction. In Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, 
Inc., [FN39] the court of appeals held that the 
doctrine of strict liability could be applied to a 
builder/developer of mass-produced homes for 
defectively installed radiant heating systems. 
[FN40] In Avner, the court relied upon Kriegler to 
extend the doctrine of strict liability in tort to 
building lot r manufacturers" for damages suffered 
by an owner as a proximate result of defects in the 
manufacturing process (cutting, filling, grading, 
compacting, etc.) causing subsidence. [FN41] Yet 
Avner and Kriegler involved injury suffered as the 
result of latent defects. [FN42] In none of the cases 
relied upon by the Lovelands has recovery been 
allowed for obvious deficiencies in the real estate 
itself. The Lovelands have not advanced a sound 
reason to make such an extension. 
FN38. 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 
Cal.Rptr. 697 (1962). 
FN39. 269 Cal.App.2d 224, 74 Cal.Rptr. 749 
(1969). 
FN40. 74 Cal.Rptr. at 752. 
FN41. 74 Cal.Rptr. at 751-53. 
FN42. Avner, 77 Cal.Rptr. at 639; Kriegler, 
74 Cal.Rptr. at 752. 
We have a further reason for declining the 
Lovelands' invitation to extend the doctrine of 
strict liability to Brown Brothers in this case. As 
noted above, the Utah legislature has adopted the 
Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. The 
legislature has thus seen fit to impose controls on 
the activities of large-scale subdividers. One of 
these controls is civil liability when subdividers 
fail to disclose to a purchaser any unusual and 
material circumstance affecting subdivided lands. 
[FN43] It would be inappropriate for this Court to 
circumvent these limits thereon by adopting a new 
model for liability. [FN44] For the above reasons, 
the trial court did not err in granting Brown 
Brothers' motion for summary judgment. 
FN43. Utah Code Ann. s 57-1 l-17(l)(c) 
(1986). 
FN44. See Stepanov, 594 P.2d at 35. 
Ill 
NORTH UNION 
[8] The Lovelands' second point is that the district 
court erred by granting summary judgment in 
favor of North Union. Specifically, the Lovelands 
contend that a question of fact existed as to 
whether North Union exercised reasonable care in 
maintaining its canal. Since we hold that North 
Union owed no duty to Michael Loveland, we 
need not reach this issue. 
On appeal, the Lovelands claim that North Union 
may be held liable for negligence. They rely on 
the attractive nuisance doctrine to provide the 
required duty of care. In Weber v. Springville City, 
[FN45] we noted that except for the duty to refrain 
from willful and wanton conduct, generally no 
duty arises out of the relationship between an owner/ 
/possessor and a trespasser. [FN46] The attractive 
nuisance doctrine evolved as an exception to this 
rule when a trespassing child is involved. [FN47] 
Although the parties argue over whether North 
Union was an owner/possessor and whether Michael 
Loveland was therefore a trespasser, because of our 
resolution of this point, *772 we need not decide 
these issues in this case. [FN48] 
FN45. 725 P.2d 1360. 
FN46. Id. at 1365. 
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FN47. Id. 
FN48. For an example of a case discussing 
these issues and applying the Restatement of 
Torts s 339 (1934) to an easement holder, see 
Cooper v. City of Reading, 392 Pa. 452, 140 
A.2d 792 (1958). 
The Lovelands additionally urge that proof of 
allurement is no longer a prerequisite to imposition 
of liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine 
and invite us to adopt Restatement (Second) of Torts 
s 339 (1965). However, as in the Weber case, 
whether this case is analyzed under the attractive 
nuisance doctrine as enunciated in Brown v. Salt 
Lake City [FN49] or under the Restatements rule 
is not outcome determinative. [FN50] 
FN49. 33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570 (1908). In 
Brown, the Court stated: [T]he doctrine of the 
turntable cases should be applied to all things 
that [1] are uncommon and [2] are artificially 
produced, and [3] which are attractive and 
alluring to children of immature judgment and 
discretion, and [4] are inherently dangerous, 
and [5] where it is practical to guard them 
without serious inconvenience and without 
great expense to the owner. Id. at 240, 93 
P.2d at 576. If a trespassing child's injuries 
are caused by a property owner/possessor's 
failure to exercise reasonable care to 
safeguard children from a condition subject to 
the doctrine, then the child may recover. 
Weber, 725 P.2d at 1365. 
FN50. See725P.2dat 1365. 
We have reviewed all of our cases which discuss 
the attractive nuisance doctrine. In the main, it is 
evident from these cases that the rule is to be 
applied contextually. [FN51] However, we 
acknowledge that some of our cases have held that 
certain conditions will not be treated as attractive 
nuisances. In Utah, these fixed rules have in 
general been limited to water hazard and 
construction cases. [FN52] There appears to be a 
trend to reject all fixed and arbitrary categories and 
to require each case to be considered in light of its 
own peculiar facts. [FN53] And as just stated, most 
of our cases are in accord with this view. 
Nevertheless, after carefully reviewing our cases and 
all those cited by the parties, we follow those of 
our cases which hold that owners/possessors of 
canals are not subject to liability under the attractive 
nuisance doctrine. [FN54] The Court recognizes 
that those cases did not deal with canals similar in 
character to North Union's canal. Yet the reasoning 
underlying those decisions justifies an extension of 
their precedent in this case. 
FN51. E.g., Peterson v. Farmers' Grain & 
Milling Co., 69 Utah 395, 400- 01, 255 P. 
436, 438 (1927); Payne v. Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Co., 62 Utah 598, 607-09, 221 P. 568, 571-
72 (1923); Bogdon v. Los Angeles & Salt 
Lake Ry. Co., 59 Utah 505, 514-16, 205 P. 
571,575-78(1922). 
FN52. Featherstone v. Berg, 28 Utah 2d 94, 
95, 498 P.2d 660, 661 (1972); Taylor v. 
United Homes, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 304, 305, 445 
P.2d 140, 141 (1968); Brinkerhoff v. Salt 
Lake City, 13 Utah 2d 214, 215, 371 P.2d 
211, 212 (1962); Charvoz v. Salt Lake City, 
42 Utah 455, 468- 69, 131 P. 901, 906-07 
(1913). 
FN53. W. Keaton & W. Prosser, Prosser & 
Keaton on the Law of Torts s 59, at 405-08, 
408 n. 92 (5th ed. 1984) (and cases cited 
therein). 
FN54. Brinkerhoff, 13 Utah 2d at 215, 371 
P.2d at 212; Charvoz, 42 Utah at 468-69, 
131 P. at 906-07. 
Our decision to disallow recovery based upon the 
attractive nuisance doctrine in this case by focusing 
upon the nature of the physical hazard as opposed 
to the unreasonableness of the specific risk created 
is predicated in part upon the fact that the doctrine 
in Utah is a creature of this Court. We therefore 
have the responsibility of carefully tailoring the 
rule's applicability in a manner consistent with the 
policies of this state. 
This Court has previously recognized that 
agriculture in this state has from the beginning 
depended to a great extent upon irrigation. [FN55] 
This is true because Utah is located in a high and 
arid region of the United States. [FN56] Thus the 
utility of irrigation canals, not only to the owner/ 
possessor of such canals, but to the public as a 
*773 whole, is of great significance. In many 
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areas of this state, the economic livelihood and well-
being of its people depend upon the existence of 
imported waters. 
FN55. Erickson v. Bennion, 28 Utah 2d 371, 
373, 503 P.2d 139, 140 (1972). The 
Lovelands' reliance on cases such as Erickson 
for a duty is misplaced inasmuch as these 
cases speak to the statutory duty not to cause 
injury to neighboring property. See Utah Code 
Ann. s 73-1-8 (1980). 
FN56. 28 Utah 2d at 373, 503 P.2d at 140. 
The Lovelands do not dispute the importance of 
irrigation water to this state. Instead, they claim 
that whether liability should be imposed in this 
case should be decided by a jury and turn upon the 
special facts of this case. They further claim that to 
allow the case to go to the jury based upon the 
attractive nuisance doctrine given the unique facts at 
hand would not impede delivery of irrigation 
waters. We disagree. 
It seems inescapable that in certain areas, safety 
measures to prevent accidents such as the one in 
this case are necessary. Yet it is equally obvious 
that it would be inappropriate for this Court to 
establish some blanket protective measure for all 
inhabited areas. Because of variations in 
population density and composition, different areas 
require that different safety measures be taken. As 
population centers shift and evolve, the type of 
measures needed necessarily changes. Given the 
importance of water to the state, the fact that the 
burden of providing blanket safeguards for children 
would unduly hinder, if not prevent, the 
economical conduct of such a necessary and highly 
beneficial enterprise (importing water), and the fact 
that ditches and canals might be rendered 
sufficiently safe by varying safety measures, it 
would appear that local governments are best suited 
to impose fencing or other protective requirements. 
Local governments have the necessary framework 
in place for making carefully reasoned and tailored 
decisions concerning such safety measures. They 
are best suited to balance all of the interests in their 
respective communities in a way this Court cannot. 
Many local governments have already assumed this 
duty and have imposed fencing requirements on 
subdividers through the passage of local 
ordinances. [FN57] 
FN57. E.g., Salt Lake County, Utah, Rev. 
Ord. s 18.24.140 (1986); Salt Lake City, 
Utah, Rev. Ord. s 42-5-2 (1986). 
The potential economic exposure which would be 
engendered by allowing a cause of action to be 
brought against irrigation companies in cases such as 
this could unnecessarily impede the importation of 
waters since alternative solutions to the problem 
before us, with substantially less devastating 
economic and social consequences, exist. If we 
were to adopt the Lovelands' position, North 
Union and other irrigation companies would be 
required to fence or cover, as a practical 
precautionary measure, or procure liability 
insurance for all similar canals in proximity to 
inhabited areas. This burden would necessarily be 
extremely costly. The Court's concern about the 
cost of imposing liability was implicit in Charvoz 
v. Salt Lake City, [FN58] where the Court made 
the following observations: 
FN58. 42 Utah at 468, 131 P. at 906. 
It appears from the record in the case at bar, as 
coming from a witness who was well qualified to 
testify upon the subject, that in Salt Lake City there 
were 500 miles of open ditches carrying water 
along the sides of the streets in a similar manner to 
that carried by the stream in question at the time of 
the accident.... If it were held to be negligence, 
therefore, for the city to maintain the stream in 
question uncovered, how could it be held that it was 
not equally negligent in permitting any other 
streams, whether larger or smaller, to remain 
uncovered? [FN59] 
FN59. Id. at 468-69, 131 P. at 907. 
We conclude that, as a matter of law, recovery 
against North Union cannot be had in this case by 
resort to the attractive nuisance doctrine. Whether 
the attractive nuisance doctrine may afford relief in 
a case not involving the use of canals or canal 
banks is left to be decided another day. [FN60] 
FN60. The Charvoz case relied in part on 
Salladay v. Old Dominion Copper Mining 
Co., 12 Ariz. 124, 100 P. 441 (1909). In 
Harris v. Buckeye Irrigation Co., 118 Ariz. 
498, 578 P.2d 177 (1978) (en banc), on 
remand, 131 Ariz. 540, 642 P.2d 885 
COPR. (C) WEST 1993 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
746 P.2d 763 
(Cite as: 746 P.2d 763, *773) 
Page 12 
(Ariz.Ct.App.1982), review denied, Mar. 23, 
1982, the Arizona Supreme Court said: We 
believe that the facts of the instant case can be 
distinguished from previous cases of this 
court and the Court of Appeals. In the instant 
case, the defendant placed a bridge at a point 
where it could be anticipated that the public 
would use it to cross the canal. Because of 
the location of the high school, the baseball 
field, and the swimming pool, it could 
reasonably be expected that children as well as 
adults would use this bridge. The defendant 
also had ample notice of the fact that the 
bridge was potentially dangerous. The bridge 
was, in fact, open to the public generally and 
the defendants did nothing either to restrict the 
use of the bridge by the public or to make it 
safe for the persons they knew were using the 
bridge The immunity given to irrigation 
districts in Salladay, supra, was based in 
sound public policy at the time. It is sound 
public policy today as far as the use of canals 
and canal banks are concerned. Unfortunately, 
this immunity sometimes leads to the callous 
"public be damned" policy exemplified by the 
testimony of the manager of the defendant 
irrigation company in the instant case. The 
statement of the manager that it was "not my 
responsibility to see that everything on our 
canal system is safe for anybody's use" and 
that he is only concerned with the safety of his 
employees and not anyone else's, is the direct 
result of the belief by the irrigation company 
that because of Salladay, supra, it had absolute 
immunity from suit. As this matter was 
decided on motion for summary judgment, all 
the facts were not developed. Assuming, 
however, that the judge or jury finds, after 
hearing all of the evidence at trial, that Marlon 
Harris fell from the bridge in question as the 
result of negligence on the part of the 
defendants or their employees in the building 
or maintenance of the bridge, we feel that 
under the peculiar facts of this case public 
policy does not require the application of the 
Salladay immunity doctrine. This, it seems, 
is the only way that the defendants and others 
in like situations can be prevented from using 
a grant of immunity as an excuse not to 
exercise reasonable care to protect the members 
of the public from a negligently constructed 
and maintained bridge they knew was being 
used by the public. Id. at 501-02, 578 P.2d at 
180-81 (emphasis added). 
*774 IV 
OREM CITY 
The Lovelands' final point is that Orem City is not 
immune from suit under the provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. [FN61] Orem City 
moved for summary judgment in the district court 
on the ground that it was immune under the Act. 
The district court granted that motion and dismissed 
the complaint as against Orem City with prejudice. 
FN61. Utah Code Ann. ss 63-30-1 to -38 
(1986 &Supp. 1987). 
In cases where a governmental entity's right to 
assert immunity is being challenged, the threshold 
question generally is whether the claimant's injuries 
resulted from the exercise of a governmental 
function. This is so because the right to maintain 
an action against the state or its political 
subdivisions may result (1) from a finding that the 
injury did not result from the exercise of a 
governmental function, or (2) from a finding that 
even though the injury resulted from the exercise 
of a governmental function, the government's 
immunity has been expressly waived in one of the 
sections of the Act. [FN62] The Lovelands first 
contend that their injuries resulted from Orem City 
activities of a nongovernmental nature 
FN62. Cox v. Utah Mortgage & Loan Corp., 
716 P.2d 783, 785 (Utah 1986); Madsen v. 
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 630 (Utah 1983). 
Section 63-30-3 of the Act provides, in pertinent 
part: "Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function...." [FN63] In 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., [FN64] the 
Court adopted the following approach for 
determining whether the activities of a 
governmental entity were within the exercise of a 
governmental function: "[T]he test for determining 
governmental immunity is whether the activity 
under consideration is of such a unique nature that 
it can only be performed by a governmental agency 
or that it is essential to the core of governmental 
activity." [FN65] 
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FN63. Utah Code Ann. s 63-30-3 (1986). 
Although the provisions of this section have 
been amended three times since this incident 
arose, none of the amendments affect our 
analysis in this case. See Act of Feb. 25, 
1985, ch. 93, s 1, 1985 Utah Laws 170; Act 
of Jan. 28, 1984, ch. 33, s 1, 1984 Utah 
Laws 148, 148; Act of March 5, 1981, ch. 
116, s 2, 1981 Utah Laws 566, 567. 
FN64. 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). 
FN65. Id. at 1236-37. 
*775 In Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., [FN66] 
Justice Oaks, writing for a majority of the Court, 
reaffirmed and clarified the test laid down in 
Standiford: 
FN66. 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981). 
The first part of the Standiford test-activity of such 
a unique nature that it can only be performed by a 
governmental agency-does not refer to what 
government may do, but to what government alone 
must do.... [T]he second part of the Standiford 
test-"essential to the core of governmental 
activity"- ... refers to those activities not unique in 
themselves (and thus not qualifying under the first 
part) but [to those activities] essential to the 
performance of those activities that are uniquely 
governmental. [FN67] 
FN67. Id. at 434 (emphasis in original). 
In their brief, the Lovelands rely on several Orem 
City activities they claim were of a 
nongovernmental nature, namely, (1) the City 
Planning Commission's receipt and analysis of the 
subdivision plat; (2) the Commission's 
recommendation to approve the plat, subject to the 
installation of various improvements; (3) the 
review and approval of the plat by the Orem City 
Council; (4) the monitoring by Orem City 
employees of the construction and development of 
Executive Estates; (5) the Orem City Planning 
Commission's recommendation (or lack thereof) to 
the Orem City Council that the canal be fenced in 
plat B of Executive Estates; and (6) assuming such 
a recommendation was made, the failure of the city 
engineer or other city employees charged with 
supervising and monitoring construction of the 
subdivision to insure that the fence was in fact 
constructed as was required. 
Orem City responds that these activities are simply 
an exercise of its inherent police powers which 
have been codified by the legislature. [FN68] It 
claims that since these powers may not be 
surrendered, their exercise by Orem City can only 
be performed by a governmental agency and thus are 
also "essential to the core of governmental 
activity." However, as was suggested in Thomas 
v. Clearfield City, [FN69] while legislative 
delegation of certain powers and duties surely 
establishes that the exercise and performance thereof 
is a governmental function for purposes of a 
political subdivision's authority to operate, it does 
not automatically follow that the function qualifies 
as a "governmental function" for purposes of 
governmental immunity analysis under Standiford. 
[FN70] 
FN68. Specifically, Orem City relies upon 
Utah Code Ann. ss 10-2-401, 10- 9-1, -4 
(1986); see also State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 
1116 (Utah 1980). 
FN69. 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982). 
FN70. See id. at 739. 
[9] The activities numbered four and six above and 
relied upon by the Lovelands need not be 
reviewed. As indicated, there is no evidence in this 
case that Orem City required plat B to be fenced. 
The activities numbered one, two, three, and five 
above all relate to review and approval of plat B of 
Executive Estates. We therefore direct our 
attention to these latter activities. 
The Lovelands contend that Orem City engaged in 
the activities to further the health and safety of 
future Executive Estates residents. The Lovelands 
claim that the forces of private enterprise demand 
that certain health and safety considerations be 
taken into account when developing property. They 
therefore conclude that such activities are not of a 
type government alone must do. In Madsen v. 
Borthick, the Court made the following 
observations: Standiford 's reference to activities 
that "can only be performed by a governmental 
agency" does not preclude governmental immunity 
for supervisory functions in some respects similar 
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to those that could be performed by a private 
association authorized by agreement, such as self-
regulation by an industry. Thomas v. Clearfield 
City, Utah, 642 P.2d 737 (1982), is not to the 
contrary. In that case, we held that sovereign 
immunity did not protect a municipality from 
liability for negligent maintenance *776 of its sewer 
system, noting that the municipality's power to 
provide sewer service was insufficient to establish 
sewer service as a "governmental function" where 
the function could also be performed privately. 
The difference between Thomas and this case is a 
difference in the nature of the services performed by 
the governmental unit. Publicly provided sewer 
services and privately provided sewer services can 
be essentially the same. But governmental 
supervision of financial institutions in the public 
interest, which includes the exercise of 
discretionary powers delegated by law, and private 
oversight by voluntary association of businesses 
are qualitatively different. The former can be 
performed only by a government agency. Thus, 
unlike the provision of sewer services, the 
governmental activity in this case qualifies as a 
"governmental function." [FN71] 
FN71.658P.2dat631. 
The difference in the nature of the planning and 
supervisory services provided by city planners and 
those provided by private sector developers is 
qualitatively different. Only governmental agencies 
such as the Orem City Planning Commission and 
the Orem City Council can realistically balance all 
of the competing interests when land is developed. 
Only they, through their supervisory roles, can 
impose restrictions which best achieve necessary 
levels of safety for future residents. [FN72] 
FN72. At the time of oral argument, the 
Lovelands relied upon Cox, 716 P.2d 783, in 
support of their contention that the activity of 
Orem City was nongovernmental. However, 
that case is readily distinguishable on its facts 
because the activity there was an escrow 
function with no aspects of uniqueness, but 
was capable of being performed by anyone. 
We hold that the activities relied upon by the 
Lovelands were in the exercise of a governmental 
function. Since we hold that the activities of Orem 
City were within the exercise of a governmental 
function, the City is immune from suit unless such 
immunity has been waived. 
The Lovelands alternatively contend immunity was 
waived in this case. Specifically, the Lovelands 
rely upon the waivers found in Utah Code Ann. ss 
63-30-8, -9, -10(1) (1986). Section 63-30-8 
provides: "Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused by the defective, unsafe, or dangerous 
condition of any highway, road, street, alley, 
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, 
viaduct or other structure located thereon." 
Section 63-30-9 provides: "Immunity from suit of 
all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused from a dangerous or defective condition of 
any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or 
other public improvement. Immunity is not 
waived for latent defective conditions." 
The Lovelands urge that this case comes within 
these waivers of immunity for seveial reasons. 
They claim that North Union's canal comes within 
the definition of a culvert and argue that the 
minutes of the City Council meetings indicate the 
City was aware of the canal that ran through the 
Executive Estates subdivision and the potential 
danger it presented to that subdivision's residents. 
Additionally, they claim the Executive Estates 
subdivision is a "public improvement" which, 
without adequate implementation of a directive to 
fence the canal, created a dangerous condition which 
resulted in their son's death. 
[10] The fallacy in the Lovelands' reasoning is their 
assumption that sections 63-30-8 and 63-30-9 
apply to defective, unsafe, or dangerous conditions 
on property which is not in the "public use." 
[FN73] This assumption is unsound. Although 
none of our cases have directly dealt with this issue, 
common sense dictates that adoption of the 
Lovelands' construction would go far beyond the 
intended scope of the waivers. And all of our case 
law is consistent with this decision. For example, 
in Stevens v. Salt Lake County, [FN74] the plaintiff 
was injured when he drove his motorbike from a 
pathway crossing a vacant lot onto an unimproved 
county road, where he was struck *777 by a passing 
motorist. The plaintiff claimed that the weeds and 
brush growing alongside the county road on the 
vacant lot obscured his vision and caused the 
accident, thus constituting a "defective, unsafe, or 
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dangerous condition" for which immunity was 
waived pursuant to section 63-30-8. [FN75] In 
affirming the summary judgment in favor of Salt 
Lake County, the Court noted: 
FN73. See Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 
126, 127 (Utah 1987) (per curiam). 
FN74. 25 Utah 2d 168, 478 P.2d 496 (1970). 
FN75. Id. at 169, 172, 478 P.2d at 497, 499. 
Our concern is with the particular facts shown in 
this case: Where the pathway upon which plaintiff 
traveled and entered into Spring Lane was upon 
private property, and upon which were growing 
whatever weeds and brush obstructed his view. It 
would place a wholly impractical burden upon 
counties if they had to assume the duty of 
correcting such conditions with respect to every 
private way that enters upon a public road. [FN76] 
FN76. Id. at 173, 478 P.2d at 499 (footnote 
omitted); see also Ingram, 733 P.2d at 127 
(section 63-30-6 does not provide immunity to 
city from suit by plaintiff who fell into water 
vault located on parking strip); Richards v. 
Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276, 278 (Utah 1985) (per 
curiam) (section 63-30-8 supported conclusion 
that city was engaged in governmental 
function where it maintained trees, bushes, and 
a sign on a parking strip); Bigelow v. 
Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 53 (Utah 1980) (trial 
court erred in granting summary judgment in 
favor of state where trial court failed to rule 
on whether traffic control system was defective 
or unreasonably dangerous under 63-30-8); 
Gorgoza v. Utah State Road Comm'n, 553 
P.2d 413, 417-18 (Utah 1976) (Ellett, J., 
dissenting) ("This is not the kind of defect in 
the highway wherein the State waives 
immunity from suit in case damages are 
occasioned. The defect, if any, was on the 
private land of Gorgoza." (Footnote 
omitted.)); Murray v. Ogden City, 548 P.2d 
896, 897, 898 (Utah 1976) (trial court erred in 
granting city summary judgment since 
immunity is waived for dangerous conditions 
on sidewalks; summary judgment in favor of 
private defendant was proper since it did not 
own or have duty to maintain sidewalk); 
McKay v. Salt Lake City, 547 P.2d 210, 211 
(Utah 1976) (immunity was waived in suit to 
recover for injury to private property since 
injury was caused by defective condition of 
street). 
Additionally, none of our cases have suggested that 
a "public improvement" as is specified in section 
63-30-9 refers to private developments. [FN77] 
FN77. See Thomas, 642 P.2d at 739-40 (Hall, 
C.J., concurring in the result); see also 13 
McQuillan, The Law of Municipal 
Corporations s 37.01, at 8 (1987). 
The Lovelands finally rely upon the waiver of 
immunity found in section 63-30- 10. That 
provision provides, in pertinent part: (1) 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for injury proximately caused by a 
negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the 
injury: ...; (c) arises out of the issuance, denial, 
suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any 
permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or 
similar authorization; or ...; (f) arises out of a 
misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it 
is negligent or intentional.... The briefs of the 
parties address at length whether Orem City owed 
the Lovelands a duty in this case. However, we 
need not reach the issue. Assuming arguendo that 
the waiver of subsection 63-30-10(1) applies and 
that such a duty exists, it is obvious that one or 
more exceptions to this waiver are controlling. 
[11] The Lovelands claim that they relied upon 
representations made by Orem City that a fence 
would be in place before water came into the ditch. 
Assuming that this representation was made to the 
Lovelands and that they did in fact rely upon such 
a representation to their detriment, subsection (f), 
quoted above, provides an exclusion for such 
misrepresentations. Moreover, subsection (c), 
quoted above clearly excludes injuries which arise 
out of the approval of subdivision plats. As 
previously indicated in this opinion, the activities 
of Orem City that most immediately led to the 
injury sustained by the Lovelands were those 
surrounding approval of the Executive Estates 
subdivision plat B without requiring the canal be 
fenced or covered. Because the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act excepts such activities 
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from *778 the waiver found in subsection 63-30-
10(1) and because sections 63-30-8 and -9 are not 
applicable for the reason discussed above, the trial 
court did not err in granting summary judgment in 
favor of Orem City. 
V 
For the reasons above stated, the trial court did not 
err in granting defendants' motions for summary 
judgment. Therefore, the judgments are affirmed. 
Costs to defendants. 
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice (concurring 
and dissenting): 
I concur in the majority opinion except for 
sustaining the summary judgment against Brown 
Brothers, the developer of the subdivision in 
question. The issue of liability was decided by the 
trial court on summary judgment, and, therefore, a 
record has not been developed which could 
elucidate such critical issues as the cost of 
providing protection from the risks presented by the 
location of the canal, the peculiar risks associated 
with a canal of this type, the location of the 
subdivision or development in this case in 
relationship to surrounding properties and the 
nature of those properties, and other factors which 
ought to bear upon the determination of whether 
Brown Brothers should be held to have a duty 
running to purchasers of homes and whether they in 
fact breached such a duty. In my view, it is not 
appropriate for this Court to decide simply as a 
matter of law that under no circumstances does a 
developer of a subdivision have a duty to protect 
purchasers of a residence from injury or death 
caused by an artificial waterway or canal located on 
the premises of a subdivision. Of course, if the 
case were to go to trial, the parents' negligence, if 
any, could be at issue. See generally Annot., 62 
A.L.R.3d 541 (1975). 
I concur with the majority opinion in other 
respects. 
DURHAM, Justice (concurring and dissenting): 
I concur in the result as to the liability of Brown 
Brothers, but write separately in part I of this 
opinion about the analysis. I dissent as to the 
liability of North Union Irrigation Co. in part II. 
I. 
Although I concur in the result as to the liability of 
Brown Brothers, I write separately to identify a 
concern about the legal relationship between an 
original subdivider and a sub vendee. Generally 
speaking, the doctrine of caveat emptor still 
applies to sales of land with the result that, in the 
absence of an express agreement, the vendee and all 
subvendees cannot hold the vendor liable for 
injuries that arise out of a dangerous condition on 
the land. Restatement (Second) of Torts s 352 
(1965). Two exceptions to this rule have 
developed: (1) liability extends to the vendor when 
he conceals a dangerous condition; and (2) a 
vendee may hold a builder-developer strictly liable 
for defects in the construction of a home. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts s 353 (1965); W. 
Prosser & W. Keaton, The Law of Torts 721 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
The majority correctly states that treatment of the 
issue of duty requires an analysis of the legal 
relations between the parties. W. Prosser & W. 
Keaton, The Law of Torts 356-57 (5th ed. 1984). 
Under general negligence analysis, the court would 
resolve this issue by determining if, as a matter of 
law, the tort- feasor could have anticipated the 
harm to the plaintiff. Restatement (Second) of 
Torts s 281 comment c (1965). Despite this general 
rule, a vendor of real estate remains totally 
immune from liability for any injury his conduct in 
maintaining the land may cause to a subsequent 
purchaser. It would be preferable, in my view, to 
apply the foreseeability rule to determine duty in 
negligence actions by vendees against vendors. In 
this case, Brown Brothers could have foreseen the 
harm to plaintiffs; therefore, they would owe a duty 
to plaintiffs to act with reasonable care under a 
general duty analysis. 
*779 One of the reasons for retaining the doctrine 
of caveat emptor in the area of real estate 
transactions is the assumption that the vendee has a 
reasonable opportunity to inspect the premises; 
therefore, the vendor has no liability for any injury 
arising out of dangerous conditions on the land at 
the time of sale. The purpose of the doctrine 
apparently is to protect vendors from suits where 
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the plaintiff presumably knew of the condition. The 
vendor, however, would receive the same 
protection under an analysis of the negligence of 
the parties involved. In this case, for example, a 
jury could easily decide that plaintiffs' negligence 
outweighed Brown Brothers' and thereby relieve 
Brown Brothers of liability. Although this would 
require Brown Brothers to litigate the suit, it seems 
a better solution to meeting the competing interests 
of the vendor and vendee than does permitting the 
vendor blanket immunity on the theory that he has 
no duty to the vendee. 
II. 
With respect to the liability of North Union 
Irrigation Co., I write to clarify the condition of 
the canal in question here and to discuss what I 
perceive as an unjustifiable paradox in Utah law. 
The majority opinion does not adequately describe 
the condition of the canal in which Michael 
Loveland drowned. North Union Irrigation Co. 
owns a canal easement running through the 
Lovelands' back yard about ten feet from their 
property line and parallel to it. The canal is made 
of cement and is approximately ten feet wide. The 
edges of the canal are overgrown with morning 
glory, which obscures the edges of the canal. The 
cement sides of the canal are covered in slippery 
moss. 
The majority opinion discusses the attractive 
nuisance doctrine, under which it declares that 
North Union has no duty to protect children from its 
canals. I do not think this doctrine should be 
applied to a child who has drowned in his own 
back yard and was not therefore a trespasser, as is 
ordinarily the case under an attractive nuisance 
analysis. I think a more apt analysis is found in 
the duty of care owed by the owners of ditches. We 
have consistently held that those in control of 
ditches and similar waterways are bound by a 
standard of reasonable care and are liable for 
damages when their conduct falls below that 
standard. In Jensen v. Davis and Weber Counties 
Canals Co., 44 Utah 10, 137 P. 635 (1913), we 
stated: [The] owners of irrigating canals or ditches 
are liable for injuries or damages which are 
directly caused by their acts of omission or 
commission, if such acts constitute negligence and 
damage follows. In other words, if by the exercise 
of ordinary care and prudence, as those terms are 
ordinarily defined in negligence cases, the damages 
could have been avoided, a failure to exercise such 
care and prudence may constitute actionable 
negligence. 44 Utah at 14, 137 P. at 636. See 
also Jenkins v. Hooper Irrigation Co., 13 Utah 
100, 44 P. 829 (1896) (holding defendant liable for 
damage to plaintiffs trees and crops which were 
destroyed when defendant's canal overflowed on 
plaintiffs land; we stated, "The true standard by 
which to test the charge of negligence was one of 
prudence and care"); Mackay v. Breeze, 72 Utah 
305, 269 P. 1026 (1928) (applying traditional 
negligence concepts in a case involving liability for 
harm to property from escaping water); Lisonbee 
v. Monroe Irrigation Co., 18 Utah 343, 54 P. 1009 
(1898) (holding that irrigation companies have a 
duty to construct and maintain their canals in such 
a way that they do not harm the property of others). 
The legislature has also imposed upon the owners 
of ditches a duty of reasonable care. Utah Code 
Ann. s 73-1-8 (1980): "The owner of any ditch, 
canal, flume or other watercourse shall maintain 
the same in repair so as to prevent waste of water 
or damage to the property of others...." 
I find it deeply ironic that our case law and statutes 
impose on ditch owners a duty of care which 
protects the property of others, while we remain 
unwilling to create a parallel duty to protect human 
life. The majority opinion justifies its conclusion 
with policy-based arguments tied to cost analysis. 
For empirical evidence, the majority *780 relies on 
Charvos v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 455, 131 P. 
901 (1913), a 1913 case containing a summary of 
evidence taken as to the condition of Salt Lake's 
ditches in that year. I am unpersuaded by that 
evidence. I think the duty of reasonable care found 
in our previous case law and statutes should be 
read to require reasonable care in protecting lives 
as well as property. At least, North Union 
Irrigation Co. should be required to prove the 
validity of the cost assumption it has asked the 
courts to rely on. 
Further, I note that whatever force of logic the 
majority opinion might have in a case in which a 
trespassing child was harmed by an exposed ditch 
does not seem to be present in this case. The 
defendants own an easement through the 
Lovelands' back yard. It was apparent to defendants 
when the subdivision containing the Loveland 
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home was constructed that children would have 
access to the canals. Ironically, the existence of 
the canal company's easement complicated the 
ability of the Lovelands to place a fence in their own 
back yard. In North Union Canal Co. v. Newell, 
550 P.2d 178 (Utah 1976), North Union Canal 
Co. sued property owners who had installed a fence 
on their property (to protect it from North Union 
Canal's easement) to compel the removal of the 
fence, which North Union claimed interfered with 
its use and enjoyment of its easement by making it 
more difficult for it to use canal maintenance 
equipment. We held that considerations such as the 
safeguarding of children allowed the installation of 
the fence, but required litigation to settle the exact 
description and placement of gates in the fence. A 
legal doctrine which imposes no duty on North 
Union Irrigation Co. to fence or maintain its canal 
in a manner reasonably safe for children, while 
simultaneously exposing property owners who 
attempt to fence canals to potential litigation, is 
more than ironic; it is unjust. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Must the municipality either rely on the developer's engineering 
plan or, if it chooses to alter these plans, use reasonable care to 
ensure that the access road from the subdivision to the county road 
is safe? 
In order to appreciate the nature of this case, an 
analogy is in order using Loveland v. Orem City Corp, . 746 P.2d 763 
(Utah 1987)• In Loveland. the developer failed to fence a canal. 
The City approved the plat without requiring the canal to be 
fenced* After the plaintiffs' son drowned in the canal, the 
plaintiffs sued Orem City for failure to require the canal to be 
fenced. The Utah Supreme Court correctly held that Orem City could 
not be sued because it simply approved the plat plan submitted and 
relied upon the engineering of the developer to ensure that the 
development covered by the plat was safe. 
But assume a different set of facts. Assume that the 
developer, after extensive engineering, submitted a plat with the 
canal fenced. Assume further that the Orem City Council, without 
using due care to ensure that the canal would still be safe, would 
not approve the plat with the canal fenced because it wanted access 
to the canal. Orem City would then have replaced a safe 
improvement with an unsafe improvement. Orem City also would fail 
to apply the standard of reasonable care which would be required if 
the canal was publicly owned. 
18 
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Robert BENNETT, et al., Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
BOW VALLEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., aka 
Flying Diamond Development Corp., Utah 
corporations; City of Provo, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah; 
and Stephen G. Stewart, an individual, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 870118. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 16, 1990. 
Landowners sued developer and city for damages 
arising from improper construction of subdivision 
and faulty city water storage tank. The Fourth 
District Court, Utah County, Ray M. Harding, J., 
dismissed city as party defendant, and landowners 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Howe, Associate 
C.J., held that: (1) landowners' equitable claim to 
have city cease leakage of storage tank and remove 
obstructions to property was not barred by 
governmental immunity; (2) maintenance of water 
storage tank system was not unique governmental 
function and so city could not invoke governmental 
immunity to bar claim for damages arising from 
negligent maintenance of tank; (3) material issue 
of fact as to whether defective public improvements 
caused landowners' injury and whether notice 
requirements were met on claim for damages 
precluded summary judgment; (4) inspection and 
acceptance of subdivision improvements under 
ordinance allowing release of performance bond 
upon inspection and acceptance of improvements 
was governmental function invoking immunity to 
bar claim for negligent release of subdivision 
improvement bonds; and (5) Governmental 
Immunity Act did not preclude suit against city 
alleging taking of property without just 
compensation. 
Reversed and remanded. 
[1] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <S^> 847 
268k847 
Immunity could not be used to defend against 
equitable action by landowners seeking to make 
city cease leakage from water storage tanks and 
remove obstructions to property caused by 
landslides resulting from leaks. U.C.A.1953, 63-
30-1 to 63-30-38. 
[2] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <§=* 857 
268k857 
Maintenance of water storage tank was not uniquely 
governmental function or essential to core of 
governmental activity so that landowners' claim for 
damages arising from negligent maintenance of 
water storage tank was not barred by timely filing 
requirements of Governmental Immunity Act. 
U.C.A.1953, 60-30- 13. 
[3] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <&* 736 
268k736 
Immunity for damage arising from claim for private 
nuisance caused by defective public improvements 
including streets, curbs, gutters, sidewalks, and 
utilities, is waived under Governmental Immunity 
Act. U.C.A.1953, 60-30-9. 
[3] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <S^ 755(1) 
268k755(l) 
Immunity for damage arising from claim for private 
nuisance caused by defective public improvements 
including streets, curbs, gutters, sidewalks, and 
utilities, is waived under Governmental Immunity 
Act. U.C.A.1953, 60-30-9. 
[4] JUDGMENT <&= 181(15) 
228kl81(15) 
Material issue of fact whether defective public 
improvements caused continuing harm precluded 
summary judgment for city in suit seeking damages 
for private nuisance caused by defective public 
improvements. U.C.A.1953, 60-30-1 to 60- 30-
38. 
[5] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <£=> 724 
268k724 
Inspection and acceptance of subdivision 
improvements pursuant to municipal ordinance that 
allowed performance bond to be released to 
developer upon inspection and acceptance of 
improvements were governmental functions 
invoking the Governmental Immunity Act, and so 
barred a claim by landowners against city for 
negligent release of subdivision improvement bonds 
prior to compliance by developer with city 
requirements to complete and maintain serviceable 
roads, sidewalks, and curb and gutter and to 
revegetate cut slopes to prevent erosion. 
U.C.A.1953, 60-30-10(l)(c, d). 
[6] ZONING AND PLANNING <@=> 353 
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414k353 
City planning commission's receipt and analysis of 
subdivision plat and approval were activities in 
exercise of governmental function and therefore 
were protected by Governmental Immunity Act 
barring claim by landowners that subdivision 
approval was representation that development was 
safe and suitable for residential use and that city 
knowingly withheld information of unstable 
conditions of development. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-1 
to 63-30-38. 
[7] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS <§^ 753(1) 
268k753(l) 
Immunity of governmental unit is not waived for 
acts or omissions of employees acting within scope 
of employment when injury arises out of deceit or 
misrepresentation by employee. U.C.A.1953, 63-
30-10(l)(b, f). 
[8] EMINENT DOMAIN <§^ 267 
148k267 
Action for taking of property without just 
compensation brought by landowners prior to 
amendment to Governmental Immunity Act adding 
provision covering such claims was not subject to 
notice requirements of Act. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-
10.5, 63-30-13. 
*421 Mark O. Van Wagoner, Craig W. Anderson, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
Gary L. Gregerson, Vernon F. Romney, Robert D. 
West, David C. Dixon, Provo, and Carman E. 
Kipp, Robert H. Rees, Salt Lake City, for Provo 
City. 
John P. Ashton, Thomas J. Erbin, Salt Lake City, 
for Bow Valley Corp. and Stephen G. Stewart. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Robert Bennett and the other plaintiffs/landowners 
appeal from the trial court's order dismissing 
Provo City as a party defendant. The order has 
been certified as a final order pursuant to rule 
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
dismissal was based on governmental immunity or, 
in the alternative, failure by plaintiffs to provide 
proper notice to the City within one year pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. s 63-30-13 (Supp.1985). 
In 1974, Provo City sought a location for a water 
storage tank and found a site at the mouth of Little 
Rock Canyon, owned by Flying Diamond, which 
later changed its name to Bow Valley 
Development. Bow Valley also owned an adjacent 
tract of land which it planned to develop as a 
residential subdivision called Sherwood Hills. 
Plaintiffs allege that in exchange for the tank site 
and access to it, Provo City officials agreed that 
Bow Valley would be given permission to develop 
the subdivision. 
Plaintiffs purchased homes in the Sherwood Hills 
subdivision between 1978 and 1983. They 
complain that three major landslides, numerous 
smaller slides, two road closures, property 
damage, and deterioration of roads, sidewalks, and 
utilities occurred in the subdivision. They allege 
that these occurrences were caused by Bow 
Valley's filling natural drainage channels, failing to 
comply with grading plans, failing to construct 
roads in a safe manner and with proper 
compaction, and failing to revegetate cut slopes. 
The dates of these events do not appear in the 
record. 
Plaintiffs further assert that despite Bow Valley's 
alleged negligence, Provo City released 
improvement bonds furnished by Bow Valley 
without requiring it to make the necessary 
improvements in the subdivision and that this 
constituted negligent release of bonds. Finally, 
plaintiffs charge that the City failed to safely 
maintain the storage tank and their property has 
been damaged by leakage from and landslides 
created by the tank. 
Plaintiff Bennett sent written "notice of claim" to 
Provo City on May 28, 1985. Approximately fifty 
other plaintiffs sent a similar notice on January 31, 
1986. Plaintiffs filed this complaint on March 6, 
1986. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code 
Ann. ss 63-30-1 to -38 (Supp.1985), establishes 
governmental immunity "for any injury which 
results from the exercise of a governmental 
function," subject to various statutory waivers. 
Utah Code Ann. s 63-30-3. In 1987, the legislature 
enacted its own definition of "governmental 
function." See s 63-30-2(4)(a) (1989). However, 
since this case arose prior to that enactment, we 
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consider the definition of governmental function 
solely under case law applicable before the 1987 
amendment: This Court has held that the test for 
determining a governmental function for 
governmental immunity purposes "is whether the 
activity under consideration is of such a unique 
nature that it can only be performed by a 
governmental agency or that it is essential to the 
core of governmental activity." Standiford v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1236-37 (Utah 
1980). We later elaborated that the Standiford test 
"does not refer to what government may do, but to 
what government alone must do" and includes 
"activities not unique in themselves ... but 
essential to the performance of those activities that 
are uniquely governmental." Johnson v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 629 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1981) 
(emphasis in original). Rocky Mountain Thrift 
Stores v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459, 462 
(Utah 1989). 
Plaintiffs' claims must be separately examined to 
determine whether each activity complained of was 
a governmental function *422 and, if it was, 
whether a statutory waiver applies. Where waiver 
applies, a timely notice of claim is required under 
sections 63-30-11 to-13. 
[1] We deal first with plaintiffs' equity claim, 
which does not involve immunity analysis. See El 
Rancho Enters, v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 
778 (Utah 1977). Plaintiffs contend that Provo 
City's water storage tanks leaked an undetermined 
amount of water into their subdivision, causing or 
adding to landslide problems which obstruct the free 
use of their property. Plaintiffs are entitled to 
maintain an action in equity for the cessation of the 
leakage and the removal of obstructions to their 
property caused thereby. Immunity is no defense to 
such an action. 
[2] We next consider plaintiffs' claim for damages 
arising from the negligent maintenance of the 
water storage tank. Is the operation and 
maintenance of a water storage tank a 
governmental function? We held that under the 
Standiford and Johnson tests, the construction, 
operation, and maintenance of a city-wide storm 
drainage system is a governmental function. Rocky 
Mountain Thrift Stores, 784 P.2d at 462. But we 
held in Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737 
(Utah 1982), that the collection and disposal of 
sewage is not a governmental function. We 
reasoned: [W]e do not agree that these functions 
are uniquely governmental or essential to the core 
of its activity. It is not even mandatory that a 
governmental entity perform these functions. In 
many rural and recreational areas of our state, 
individual homeowners or small clusters of homes 
legally provide their own sewer services with 
septic tanks. Thomas, 642 P.2d at 739. The same 
reasoning is clearly applicable to the operation of a 
municipal water system. Cities can and do operate 
water systems on a commercial basis. Gordon v. 
Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 (1964). 
In many areas of our state, residents maintain wells 
and provide their own water. Also, there are 
privately owned companies supplying water to 
residents. We conclude that the maintenance of a 
water storage tank is not uniquely governmental or 
essential to the core of governmental activity. That 
being so, section 63-30-13, requiring timely 
presentation of a claim, did not apply on March 6, 
1986, when this action was filed. Dalton v. Salt 
Lake Suburban Sanitary District, 676 P.2d 399, 
400-01 (Utah 1984). 
[3, 41 We next address plaintiffs' claim for a 
private nuisance caused by defective public 
improvements, including streets, curbs, gutters, 
sidewalks, and utilities. Immunity for damage 
arising therefrom is waived under section 63-30-9, 
which provides: "Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused from a dangerous or defective condition of 
any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or 
other public improvement. Immunity is not waived 
for latent defective conditions." See Sanford v. 
University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 292, 488 P.2d 
741, 745 (1971). Provo City responds that the 
damages of which plaintiffs complain arose from 
floods in 1983 and asserts immunity for the 
management of a natural disaster under Utah Code 
Ann. s 63-30-3 or, alternatively, that notice of claim 
was sent to the City too late to satisfy the 
requirements of section 63-30-13. See Rocky 
Mountain Thrift Stores, 784 P.2d at 461-62, 
holding that the 1985 amendment to section 63-30-
3 is not retroactive. Inasmuch as plaintiffs allege 
continuing harm that arose from defective public 
improvements within the year when notice was 
given, factual questions remain to be developed at a 
full and adequate evidentiary hearing. We 
therefore reverse the summary judgment and remand 
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for such a hearing. In addressing this issue, the 
parties and the trial court should be guided by our 
recent decision in Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 
P.2d 838 (1990) 
[5] Turning to plaintiffs' tenth claim for relief, they 
complain that Provo City negligently released the 
subdivision improvement bonds furnished by Bow 
Valley. They charge that Bow Valley failed to 
complete and maintain serviceable roads, 
sidewalks, and curb and gutter in a safe manner and 
with proper compaction and failed to revegetate cut 
slopes to prevent erosion, *423 which caused 
damage to their property. They argue that the bonds 
should not have been released until these conditions 
were remedied, and they seek to interpret Cox v. 
Utah Mortgage and Loan Corp., 716 P.2d 783 
(Utah 1986), as holding that a cause of action will 
lie for the negligent supervision of funds every 
time a factual dispute arises out of the making of 
improvements. 
In Cox, the developer had placed money in escrow 
to guarantee construction of the off-site 
improvements. The funds allegedly were 
negligently released by the city before the 
completion of the improvements. Our decision 
rested on a narrow ground: Pleasant Grove 
admitted that it was unable to determine for what 
three releases of money totalling approximately 
$61,000 were made in payment. That admission 
raises a significant factual dispute on the issue of 
failure to properly supervise disbursements of 
funds, precluding a judgment in favor of Pleasant 
Grove as a matter of law. Cox, 716 P.2d at 786. 
The plaintiffs in Cox attacked the negligent 
supervision of the escrowed funds, which we held 
not to be a governmental function. The act of 
releasing funds and being accountable to know for 
what purpose they are being released is "an escrow 
function with no aspects of uniqueness, but [is] 
capable of being performed by anyone." Loveland 
v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 776 n. 72 
(Utah 1987). However, the release of a 
performance bond by a city pursuant to municipal 
ordinance that requires release of the bond upon 
inspection and acceptance of the improvements is 
qualitatively different. In the instant case, 
plaintiffs are not attacking the supervision of the 
disbursement of funds, but the inspection and 
acceptance of improvements which plaintiffs allege 
were never completed. The inspection and 
acceptance of subdivision improvements are 
governmental functions for which immunity has not 
been waived. Utah Code Ann. s 63-30-10(lj(c) & 
(d); Loveland, 746 P.2d at 776. 
Plaintiffs allege in their twelfth claim for relief that 
Provo City engaged in a conspiracy to defraud. 
This claim also attacks subdivision approval. 
Plaintiffs argue that subdivision approval was a 
representation that Sherwood Hills was safe and 
suitable for residential use and Provo City 
knowingly withheld information of the unstable 
conditions. In Loveland, this court concluded that 
the city planning commission's receipt and analysis 
of subdivision plat and approval were activities 
done in exercise of a governmental function. 
Loveland, 746 P.2d at 775-76. We stated, "Only 
governmental agencies such as the Orem City 
Planning Commission and the Orem City Council 
can realistically balance all of the competing 
interests when land is developed. Only they, 
through their supervisory roles, can impose 
restrictions which best achieve necessary levels of 
safety for future residents." Id. at 776; see also 
Seal v. Mapleton City, 598 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979) 
(city had not abused its discretion in disapproving 
subdivision plan after balancing competing 
interests). 
[6, 7] It follows that in the instant case only Provo 
City can balance all of the competing interests 
when development of land is sought. Therefore, 
the city planning commission's receipt and analysis 
of subdivision plat and approval were activities in 
the exercise of a governmental function and 
therefore were protected by governmental immunity. 
For the reasons we have heretofore enumerated, 
there is no waiver of immunity. In addition, section 
63-30-10 provides that immunity is not waived for 
acts or omissions of employees acting within the 
scope of their employment when a plaintiff's injury 
arises out of deceit or misrepresentation by the 
employee. Utah Code Ann. s 63-30-10(l)(b) & (f) 
(Supp.1985). 
[8] Plaintiffs' last claim is that their property has 
been damaged or taken for a public use without 
just compensation by Provo City, including Provo's 
failure to maintain roads and oiher public 
improvements, in violation of amendment V of the 
United States Constitution and article I, section 22 
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of the Utah Constitution. See our recent opinion 
in Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 
622 (Utah 1990). Colman held in effect that such 
an *424 action can be maintained under article I, 
section 22 in proper cases. Inasmuch as the instant 
case was decided in the trial court on a motion to 
dismiss, we have no factual basis which would 
enable us to determine whether harms complained 
of are compensable under the above constitutional 
provisions. Since we are remanding this case to the 
trial court for an evidentiary hearing on other 
claims, the court may need to take evidence and 
make a determination of plaintiffs' claim for the 
damaging or taking of their property for a public 
use if they are not compensated for the same damage 
on their other claims. We further hold that it was 
unnecessary for plaintiffs to give notice of this 
claim to Provo City under section 63-30-13 
inasmuch as their claim arose before 1987, when 
the legislature amended the Governmental Immunity 
Act by enacting section 63-30-10.5 to provide for 
such claims and waive immunity from suit on 
them. We express no opinion on whether timely 
notice must be given of "taking and damaging 
property" claims arising after the 1987 enactment, 
since that issue is not before us. 
In sum, we conclude that plaintiffs' equitable claim 
is not barred by governmental immunity and need 
not conform to statutory notice requirements. See 
El Rancho Enters, v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 
778 (Utah 1977). Furthermore, the maintenance of 
a water storage tank system is not a unique 
governmental function which is essential to the core 
of government, and thus there is no governmental 
immunity on the water tank damage claims. See 
Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 
430 (1964). Factual questions need to be resolved 
before it can be determined whether the defective 
public improvements of which plaintiffs complain 
caused their injury and whether notice 
requirements were met. We hold that immunity 
bars the claim for negligent release of bonds, as 
the "precise activity" in question was not the 
supervision of the disbursement of funds, but the 
adequacy of the inspection of the subdivision and 
the "premature" acceptance of the improvements 
thereon. See Cox, 716 P.2d 783. Finally, we 
conclude that governmental immunity does not 
preclude the bringing of a suit under amendment V 
of the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 22 of the Utah Constitution in a proper 
case. See Colman, 795 P.2d at 625-627. Timely 
notice of claim under section 63-30-13 was 
unnecessary. 
We reverse and remand to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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road, but instead focuses on whether the street is open to public 
use. The purpose of this broad definition of "highway" seems to be 
to protect all motorists, whether using a public or private 
roadway. 11500 North is open to public use. There is no reason to 
believe that the Legislature intended to expose those using private 
roads to governmental negligence while offering relief to those 
injured on negligently designed private roads. 
II.B. If Highland City has waived immunity under the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) , then the city may not recover that 
immunity if an exception to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1989) 
also applies. Instead, where both the exception and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-8 (1989) apply, the governmental entity is deemed to have 
waived immunity. Sanford v. University of Utah. 488 P.2d 741, 745 
(Utah 1971); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R., 749 P.2d 
660, 667 n.6 (Utah App. 1988); Provo City Corp. v. State of Utah, 
795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990). The trial court erred by failing 
to consider whether Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) applied after 
it determined that an exception to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) 
(1989) also applied. 
III. Highland City has waived immunity under Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-10(1) (1989), which provides that governmental entities have 
waived immunity for all negligent acts committed by their employees 
within the scope of employment. Here, the Plaintiff has alleged 
14 
In sum, there is nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 
(1989) which suggests that immunity is retained when the 
governmental entity acts negligently with respect to a privately 
owned road in the public use. The broad wording of the statute and 
the apparent purpose of the statute both suggest that the remedy 
should be the same regardless of whether the government negligently 
designs a public road or a private road in the public use. In both 
instances, the negligent act is the same, the injuries are the 
same, and the public sought to be protected is the same. Only the 
name on the title differs. 
Thus, the Plaintiff respectfully submits that because the 
statute makes no distinction between public and private roads, this 
Court should not create one absent a showing by Highland City that 
the Legislature intended to shield governmental entities from their 
negligence simply because the title to the road was privately held. 
2. UTAH CODE ANN. S 63-30-10(l)(c) (1989) IS SUBJECT TO UTAH CODE 
ANN. S 63-30-8 (1989). 
The trial court ruled that Highland City had retained 
immunity under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (c) 
(1989), and therefore refused to consider whether Highland City had 
waived immunity under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 
(1989). This ruling proceeds from the assumption that Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10 (c) (1) (1989) is not subject to Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-8 (1989) . But Utah law consistently holds that if both Utah Code 
29 
Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) and an exception to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(1) (1989) apply, the governmental entity is held to have waived 
immunity. 
For example, in Sanford v. University of Utah, 488 P.2d 
741 (Utah 1971), the Utah Supreme Court held that: 
Since the waiver of immunity in Sees. 8 and 9 
encompasses a much broader field of tort 
liability that merely negligent conduct of 
employees within the scope of their 
employment, the legislature could not have 
intended than Sec. 10, including its 
exceptions, should modify Sees. 8 and 9, even 
though it be conceded that the negligent 
conduct of an employee might be involved in an 
action for injuries caused by the creation or 
maintenance of a dangerous or defective 
condition. 
Id. at 745 (emphasis added). 
In Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. , 749 P.2d 660 
(Utah App. 1988), this Court noted that: 
In his cross-appeal, Gleave did not challenge 
the trial court's dismissal of UDOT. Rio 
Grande, in both its opposition to UDOT's pre-
trial motion to dismiss and in its appeal to 
this court, has not contended that Gleavefs 
injury was caused by UDOT's creation of a 
dangerous condition on a road, for which 
immunity is expressly waived in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-8 (1986). This separate waiver 
provision is not subject to the "discretionary 
function" exception in Utah Code Ann. § 63-3 0-
lOfl). [citations omitted]. 
Id. at 667 n.6 (emphasis added). See also Provo City Corp. v. State 
of Utah, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990). 
30 
Thusf Utah law in this area is clear. If Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-8 (1989) applies to this matter, then Highland City has 
waived immunity, even if it is found that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(1)(c) (1989) also applies. 
HIGHLAND CITY HAS WAIVED IMMUNITY FOR THE 
NEGLIGENT DESIGN OF THE INTERSECTION UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN, § 63-30-10(1) (1989), 
Even if Highland City did not waive immunity under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989), it has waived immunity against the 
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint under the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (1989), which provides: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury: 
* * * 
Id. 
Plaintiff has alleged that Highland City employees, 
acting within the scope of their employment, negligently designed 
the Intersection, thereby creating a defective, unsafe, and 
dangerous condition which was the proximate cause of the 
Plaintiff's injuries. As such, Highland City has waived immunity 
from suit. 
The trial court did not consider this provision because 
it found that an exception to this provision, Utah Code Ann. § 63-
31 
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63-30-5 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any 
contractual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations 
shall not be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 
63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Division of Water Resources is not 
liable for failure to deliver water from a reservoir or associated facility autho-
rized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to 
deliver the contractual amount of water is due to drought, other natural 
condition, or safety condition that causes a deficiency m the amount of avail-
able water. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 5; 1975, ch. ment, effective April 29, 1991, designated the 
189, § 1; 1978, ch. 27, § 4; 1983, ch. 129, § 4; existing provisions as Subsection (1) and added 
1985, ch. 82, § 1; 1991, ch. 251, § 1. Subsection (2). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bountiful City, 803 P 2d 141 (Utah 1990). 
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions involving prop-
erty. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Scope of section. ing damage or destruction of private property 
This section waives immunity only for ac- by a governmental entity does not fall within 
tions to recover property, quiet title, clear title, the grant of immunity m this section Hansen 
or resolve disputes over mortgages or hens
 v Salt Lake County, 794 P 2d 838 (Utah 1990). 
held by a governmental entity; a claim alleg-
63-30-7. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1991, ch. 76, § 10 repeals negligent operation of motor vehicles, with ex-
§ 63-30-7, as last amended by Laws 1990, ch. ceptions, effective April 29, 1991 
204, § 1, waiving immunity for injury from 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defec-
tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, 
bridges, or other structures. 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set 
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of 
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, 
viaduct, or other structure located on them. 
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